2016
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12270
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Stealing to Survive? Crime and Income Shocks in Nineteenth Century France

Abstract: International audienceUsing local administrative data from 1826 to 1936, we document the evolution of crime rates in nineteenth century France and we estimate the impact of a negative income shock on crime. Our identification strategy exploits the phylloxera crisis. Between 1863 and 1890, phylloxera destroyed about 40% of French vineyards. We use the geographical variation in the timing of this shock to identify its impact on property and violent crime rates, as well as minor offences. Our estimates suggest th… Show more

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Cited by 56 publications
(39 citation statements)
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“…Trauma seems to induce (parochial) pro-social behavior, while the effects of negative income and wealth shock are unclear. In particular, we know from quasiexperimental studies that negative income shocks induce more anti-social behavior, such as property crimes (Bignon, Caroli, & Galbiati, 2017;Cortés, Santamaría & Vargas, 2016;Dube and Vargas, 2013). However, naturally occurring situations make inequality due to random shocks salient, potentially inducing lower pro-social behavior.…”
Section: Páginamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Trauma seems to induce (parochial) pro-social behavior, while the effects of negative income and wealth shock are unclear. In particular, we know from quasiexperimental studies that negative income shocks induce more anti-social behavior, such as property crimes (Bignon, Caroli, & Galbiati, 2017;Cortés, Santamaría & Vargas, 2016;Dube and Vargas, 2013). However, naturally occurring situations make inequality due to random shocks salient, potentially inducing lower pro-social behavior.…”
Section: Páginamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In other words, the scope of cheating grows during crises. 12 Type A games trivially lead to responsible actions in every culture: the unique equilibrium outcome is r. Given assumption 1, C games have two Nash Equilibria: The …rst Nash Equilibrium, (c; f ), is subgame perfect; the other equilibrium, (r; p), is not subgame perfect as it involves the commitment by player 2 to punish the cheating action of player 1. Responsible actions are in most interpretations associated with higher total welfare, hence we assume that:…”
Section: The Economic Interactionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Each of these effects might lead to increases in criminality, but with vastly different implications for how to combat or insulate against these criminal responses to employment shocks. While canonical models of criminal activity emphasize economic incentives (Becker, 1968;Ehrlich, 1973), empirical studies of criminal activity document the importance of both economic incentives (Bignon et al, 2016;Blattman and Annan, 2015;Watson et al, 2019) and a myriad of other behavioral and psychological drivers (Anderson et al, 2015;Blattman et al, 2017;Bondurant et al, 2018;Carpenter, 2005;Lindo et al, 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%