Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism about Value

Abstract

Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain some compelling aspects of common sense morality, and it may justify status quo bias. * I am greatly indebted to Derek Parfit and Larry Temkin, each of whose work inspired much of my thinking here, and whose generous comments were extremely helpful. I am also grateful for comments from Boris Kment, Michael Otsuka, Bastian Stern, Trevor Teitel, and the reviewers and editors at Ethics. I owe special thanks to Thomas Kelly for encouragement and invaluable feedback on several drafts.

Political conservation, or how to prevent institutional decay

“…Existence value can be based either on a thing's particularity or the relation of individuals to that thing. Current scholarship is interested in existence value primarily because it constitutes a neglected axiological category (Brennan & Hamlin, ; Cohen, ; Nebel, ). Its practical implications may not reach too far.…”

Psikolojik Yanlılıkların Finansal Çerçevede Değerlendirilmesi

“…Ancak olumlu sonuç eylemden kaynaklandığında eylemsizliğe göre bireyler daha fazla mutlu olurken, olumsuz sonuç eylemden kaynaklandığında da eylemsizliğe göre daha mutsuz olurlar (Ritov ve Baron, 1992). Nebel (2015) ise statükoyu korumanın literatürde yaygın şekilde kabul edildiğinin aksine her zaman irrasyonel bir davranış olmadığını iddia eder. Kimi zaman statükoyu seçmenin tek sebebi statüko olması değil en iyi alternatif olması yahut başka sebeplerin varlığıdır.…”

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than*

“…We can perhaps understand value along the lines of relative simultaneity. In other work (Nebel ), I propose a reference‐dependent notion of value, inspired by Tversky and Kahneman ()'s notion of reference‐dependent preferences . Instead of a single betterness relation over all outcomes, there are many betterness relations, each indexed to some privileged reference point.…”

“…In Nebel (), I propose reference‐dependent value as a way of making sense of rational status quo bias as well as deliberation under an essentially comparative view of the good. Ideas similar to reference‐dependent betterness have been suggested by Brennan and Hamlin (, “state‐dependent value”), Frick (,“context‐dependent betterness”), and Dreier (,“world‐centered value”).…”