Static Analysis for the π-Calculus with Applications to Security

Abstract

Control Flow Analysis is a static technique for predicting safe and computable approximations to the set of values that the objects of a program may assume during its execution. We present an analysis for the-calculus that shows how names will be bound to actual channels at run time. The result of our analysis establishes a super-set of the set of channels to which a given name may be bound and of the set of channels that may be sent along a given channel. Besides a set of rules that permit to validate a given solution, we also o er a constructive procedure that builds solutions in low polynomial time. Applications of our analysis include establishing two simple security properties of processes. One example is that P has no leaks: P o ers communication to the external environment through public channels only, and con nes its secret channels within itself. The other example is connected to the no read-up/no write-down property of Bell and LaPadula: once processes are given levels of security clearance, we check that a process at a high level never sends channels to processes at a lower level.

A Note on the Perfect Encryption Assumption in a Process Calculus

“…Thus, one can use the standard techniques for protocol analysis based on formal methods (e.g. type systems [1], control flow analysis [6], model checkers [9,11], etc.) to check if a given protocol is DY P -safe.…”

Towards Security Analyses of an Identity Federation Protocol for Web Services in Convergent Networks

“…Research in this active branch of computer security has led to a variety of formal techniques; some of these are based on process algebras [8]- [11]; others on proof techniques for authentication logic [12]- [14]; some exploit type systems and other static analyses [15], [16]; yet others use automata [17]. A common analysis strategy is to test the behaviour of one's protocol specification within a hostile environment, by running it in a setting in which the presence of honest participants is complemented with a malicious adversary.…”

Formal analysis of some secure procedures for certificate delivery

“…Other approaches are based on proof techniques for authentication logic (e.g., [12,13,14]). Type systems and other static analyses have also been successfully exploited (e.g., [15,16]). …”