Stateless Cloud Auditing Scheme for Non-Manager Dynamic Group Data With Privacy Preservation

Abstract

As one of the core services of cloud computing, cloud storage could satisfy various storage and management requirements caused by the growth of data. Considering the complexity and uncontrollability of the cloud storage environment, many cloud auditing schemes were presented to assure the integrity of data in the cloud. However, most existing schemes have security risks, such as identity privacy and data privacy disclosure, authority abuse of group managers and collusion attacks during user revocation. To solve these problems, we propose a stateless cloud auditing scheme for non-manager dynamic group data with privacy preservation. The proposed scheme not only realizes user identity privacy preservation but also preserves data privacy security with the random masking technique. Unlike other solutions, our scheme allows t group users to trace the user's identity cooperatively without group managers, which eliminates authority abuse of group managers and provides non-frameability. Meanwhile, utilizing the concept of Shamir Secret Sharing, our scheme divides the resigning process into several parts to resist collusion attacks during user revocation. By the designed binary tree, group users could trace dynamic data changes and recover the latest data when existing data are damaged. Besides, both users and the third-party auditor (TPA) are stateless in our scheme; that is, they no need to maintain data index information during cloud auditing. Our scheme also achieves mutual supervision between users and cloud service providers (CSPs), which ensures data are non-repudiation on both parties. Furthermore, we construct an efficient incentive for data visitors by using the blockchain technology and design a secure data sharing model to guarantee that data owners control their data ownership. Certificateless cryptography assures that the proposed scheme avoids certificate management and key escrow problems. Finally, security analysis and performance evaluation show that our scheme is secure and efficient.

An Efficient Data Auditing Protocol With a Novel Sampling Verification Algorithm

“…The Subscript set of chal Loci Specific location of mi and query the IKL list to reveal its identity. But as mentioned in [5], [19], the participation of manager or TPA may lead to abuse of authority or data loss, so how to ensure data privacy and resist collusion attacks becomes very important. [5] proposed to use random masking technique to blind data ensuring data privacy against TPA.…”

“…But as mentioned in [5], [19], the participation of manager or TPA may lead to abuse of authority or data loss, so how to ensure data privacy and resist collusion attacks becomes very important. [5] proposed to use random masking technique to blind data ensuring data privacy against TPA. At the same time, shamir secret sharing is used to tracing the user's identity without group managers to resist collusion attacks.…”

Certificateless Reliable and Privacy-Preserving Auditing of Group Shared Data for FOG-CPSs

“…In CLPKC, like IBC, the authenticity of the public key of an user is implicit; however, the full private key of an user is known only to that user. Recently, a number of CLPKC-based shared data auditing protocols have been proposed in the literature [16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24]39] for traditional cloud storage systems. However, these protocols cannot be directly adopted for a FOG-CPS because of its discriminating characteristics as discussed below.…”

“…In these protocols, the auditor can extract the data blocks from the information received from the cloud as part of the data auditing process. Recently, a few privacy-preserving CLPKC-based shared data auditing protocols have been proposed by the researchers [23,24,39] for traditional cloud storage systems. But, none of these schemes can ensure the reliability criteria of the auditing service against a semi-trusted data auditor in a FOG-CPS, as defined above.…”

“…Moreover, the schemes in [23,24] employ a weaker notion of data privacy which only ensures that a compromised auditor will not be able to extract any information regarding the challenged data blocks from the data possession proofs received from the CSP. However, the data possession proofs sent by the CSP leaks information regarding the metadata corresponding to the challenged blocks, since the CSP does not employ any masking technique to hide the part of a data possession proof computed from the metadata.…”