State Sponsorship of Religiously Motivated Terrorism: A Deadly Combination

Carter, Brittnee; Nuys, Maya Van; Albayrak, Cagil

doi:10.1080/17419166.2020.1848558

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…To do so, we followed prior studies of a similar design combining kidnapping-incident records from the GTD with the organization-level data from the Big Allied and Dangerous Insurgency Dataset (BAAD-I) (Asal et al 2018). A number of peer-reviewed studies have taken this approach, merging incident-level data from the GTD with the BAAD group-level attributes to conduct group-level analyses on violent political actors ( see for example, Asal et al 2021; Boyd 2016; Carter et al 2021; Mierau 2015; Pilny and Proulx 2022). BAAD-I contains 1,386 group-year observations on 140 insurgent groups between 1998 to 2012, selected based on whether they had no less than 25 battlefield deaths as recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in any of the observed years.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Ransom and Political Concessions? Explaining Changes in Insurgents’ Kidnapping Involvement Versus Event-frequency

Liu

Eisner

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Kidnapping is a common tactic used by insurgent groups. However, why insurgents commit kidnappings remains insufficiently understood. Based on 1,386 group-year observations of 140 insurgents between 1998 and 2012, we analyze conditions driving the within-group temporal changes in their involvement (1 vs 0) versus event-frequency in kidnappings. We find that changes in specific quasi-state activities (i.e., extraction and provision of public services), which may rely on kidnappings for coercive enforcement and social control, predict kidnapping “involvement” only. Meanwhile, general resource and capacity conditions (i.e., territory-control, criminal networks and combat-lethality) influence changes in both kidnapping involvement and event-frequency.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Ransom and Political Concessions? Explaining Changes in Insurgents’ Kidnapping Involvement Versus Event-frequency

Liu

Eisner

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Why insurgents engage in kidnappings: A coercive strategy in quasi-state governance and control?

Liu,

Eisner

2024

Journal of Peace Research

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Despite the common perception viewing kidnappings as means to generate ransom income and to obtain political concessions, it remains unclear why kidnappings are disproportionately employed by some violent insurgent groups but not by the others. Combining data from the Global Terrorism Database and the Big Allied and Dangerous Insurgency Dataset, we empirically examined this question with a theoretical focus on the possible role of insurgents’ performance of state-like functions, which may necessitate the use of kidnappings as an illicit form of ‘policing’ and punishment for social control. Our analyses mainly focused on three aspects of quasi-state activities: extraction; provision of public services; and warring activities. A series of negative binomial regressions were conducted to examine the effects of insurgents’ quasi-state activities on their kidnapping activities over a base model with only group capacity and resource factors. We found that the initial effects of territory-control and membership size disappeared when variables measuring quasi-state activities were included into the model. This suggests that the influence of group capacity and resources on kidnappings may be an indirect one via insurgents’ strategic need for coercive control when contending for quasi-state status.

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Target state responses to external support of rebel groups: Revealing the impact of support level and interstate strategic interaction

Kınay-Kılıç,

Aydınlı,

Tokdemir

2024

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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How do target states react to third-party sponsorship of rebel groups? In this article, we provide a typology of responses from target states based on their severity and comprehensiveness level. We argue that the external support level and existing strategic interaction between targets and sponsors are crucial to explain the variation in target responses toward state sponsors since they affect the target states’ level of perceived threat. We test our theoretical claims using an original dataset featuring target responses between 1991 and 2010. Our findings show that strategic rivalry is the most crucial factor in increasing the severity and comprehensiveness of responses. Higher levels of support for rebel groups increase only coercive responses and do not impact comprehensiveness, whereas formal alliances decrease the adoption of mixed responses. Our study contributes to the literature on the external support of rebels and conflict management with implications for predicting target states’ responses to sponsorship.

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State Sponsorship of Religiously Motivated Terrorism: A Deadly Combination

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Beyond Ransom and Political Concessions? Explaining Changes in Insurgents’ Kidnapping Involvement Versus Event-frequency

Beyond Ransom and Political Concessions? Explaining Changes in Insurgents’ Kidnapping Involvement Versus Event-frequency

Why insurgents engage in kidnappings: A coercive strategy in quasi-state governance and control?

Target state responses to external support of rebel groups: Revealing the impact of support level and interstate strategic interaction

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