State-sponsored development, oil and democratization

Gürses, Mehmet

doi:10.1080/13510340902884622

Cited by 27 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Muslim dominance seems to reduce the adverse effects of oil on religious freedom, suggesting that Islam and oil do not necessarily form a "nasty alliance." These results suggest that institutional legacies might condition the effects of oil in different directions, supporting arguments of others (Gurses 2009). …”

supporting

confidence: 74%

“…Indeed, Gurses (2009) shows that oil and Islam´s effect on democratization is highly contingent on other factors, and that in many majority-Muslim societies, oil-based development enhances modernization among an emerging middle class. Many previous arguments, particularly arguments about rentier states base their analyses on how oil changes structures of economies, which in turn regulate social outcomes, such as the change in values among individuals.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The question of oil´s effects on societal development, particularly democratization and political violence are highly contested (Brunschweiler and Bulte 2008, Gurses 2009, Menaldo 2016, Norris 2011, Ross 2012. Some argue that the real culprit for socio-political and economic failure, particularly of the oil-rich Middle East is Islam and deep institutional factors that precede the importance of oil (Donno and Russett 2004, Fish 2011, Lust 2011, Norris 2011.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Oil, Islam, and the Middle East: An Empirical Analysis of the Repression of Religion, 1980–2013

Albertsen

Soysa

2017

Politics and Religion

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There is a lively debate on the relative impacts of Islam, oil wealth, and Middle Eastern institutional legacies regarding democratization and the spread of liberal values. We examine this issue using religious repression. We argue that oil-wealthy rulers use religious monopoly to control dissent. Our results show that oil wealth increases religious repression above the effects of Muslim dominance and a host of sundry controls. The MENA region seems to matter more than Islam. Interestingly, the conditional effect of oil and the MENA region is positive on religious freedom. The data suggest that several Gulf monarchies have more religious freedoms than other Muslim dominant states, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, or even Israel and Jordan. The worst religious repression is among oil producers in Central Asia. The results are robust to a host of intervening factors, different measures of oil wealth, alternative data on religious freedom, and estimating method.3

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supporting

confidence: 74%

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Oil, Islam, and the Middle East: An Empirical Analysis of the Repression of Religion, 1980–2013

Albertsen

Soysa

2017

Politics and Religion

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“…Oskarsson and Ottosen () argue that there can be a temporal variation in the strength and direction of the relationship. Others argue that oil may not hinder democracy and can even be a blessing in other geographic regions, such as Latin America (Smith and Kraus, ; Dunning, ), or across regions (Gurses, ; Haber and Menaldo, ). The claim that oil wealth tends to block democratic transitions has recently been challenged by Haber and Menaldo (), who use historical data going back to 1800 and conclude there is no ‘resource curse’.…”

Section: Brief Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in Africa?

Anyanwu¹,

Erhijakpor²

2014

African Development Review

120

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This paper uses recent data on historical oil wealth to provide new evidence on the effect of oil wealth on democracy in Africa from 1955 to 2008. We find that oil wealth is statistically associated with a lower likelihood of democratization when we estimate the relationship in a pooled cross-sectional and time-series setting. In addition, when estimated using fixed effects and IV-2SLS methods, the strong negative statistical association continues to hold. Indeed, this result is robust to the source of oil wealth data, the choice and treatment of the variables set, and the sample selection. Our results also show other interesting and important results. The cross-country evidence examined in the study confirms that the 'Lipset/Aristotle/ modernization hypothesis' (that prosperity stimulates democracy) is a strong empirical regularity. Also, the propensity for democracy rises with population size, population density, ethnic fractionalization, having British legal origin or colonial heritage, and having a supportive institutional environment in the form of maintenance of the rule of law. However, apart from oil wealth, democracy tends to fall with linguistic fractionalization and rough (mountainous) terrain. Moreover, consistent with the data, North Africa consistently fails to favor democratic development.

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“…There have been a number of scholars who have questioned the link between resource abundance and economic growth and conflict. See, for instance, Gurses (), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (, ), and van der Ploeg and Poelheke ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do “Resource‐Cursed States” Have Lower Levels of Social and Institutional Trust? Evidence from Africa and Latin America

Ishiyama

Martinez

Ozsut

2018

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective This study examines whether a state's abundance of natural resource wealth, such as oil or gas, leads to lower levels of social and institutional trust than in countries that are not as “cursed” with resources. Methods To test this we use survey data from both the Afrobarometer survey (2008–2009) and comparable data on Latin America from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), using 44 countries, as well as subnational data from two large oil‐producing countries (Nigeria and Mexico). Results Using multilevel logit analysis we find that individuals in countries that are oil and gas producers are less likely to exhibit high levels of social or institutional trust than individuals in countries that are not oil or gas producers. However, when examining oil‐producing regions within Nigeria and Mexico, we find that individuals in such regions tend to express relatively higher levels of individual social and institutional trust than regions that are not oil producers. Conclusion These findings can be explained by the differential effects of oil and gas wealth—at the national level, oil and gas wealth promotes corruption and a general erosion of both institutional and interpersonal trust, especially for those who live in regions that do not directly benefit from oil and gas revenues. However, in regions within countries, people who reside in such regions are more likely to directly benefit from the economic spoils and patronage derived from resource revenues.

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State-sponsored development, oil and democratization

Cited by 27 publications

References 31 publications

Oil, Islam, and the Middle East: An Empirical Analysis of the Repression of Religion, 1980–2013

Oil, Islam, and the Middle East: An Empirical Analysis of the Repression of Religion, 1980–2013

Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in Africa?

Do “Resource‐Cursed States” Have Lower Levels of Social and Institutional Trust? Evidence from Africa and Latin America

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