State Resistance to Authority in Federal Unions: The Early United States (1790–1860) and the European Community (1958–94)

Abstract

These quotes point to a puzzle, the puzzle with which this study begins: Within the past forty years, national member-states not only accepted the interpretive authority of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as the supreme decision maker for conflicts between member-state authority and central federal authority of the European Community (since 1994, the European Union) but also accepted this court's dictates that the treaties forming the community had constitutional status as supreme law in every member state and that European-level law had higher law status within every member state, superseding any national law to the contrary. Indeed, European member-state acceptance of this development advanced much more rapidly than state acceptance of the U.S. Supreme Court in its first several decades. Yet this pattern of respective acceptance of central federal authority runs counter to prevailing understandings of sovereignty.

From Fundamental Law to Constitutional Politics-And Back

“…Almost all this work depicts the Court as interacting with other institutions, but scholars such as Burgess (1992), Fisher (1988), Fisher and Devins (1992, and Stumpf (1965) have focused more specifically on the issue of interbranch interpretation. Similar themes are evident in work by Goldstein (1997) and Whittington (1996), which draws attention to the extent to which our constitutional arrangements have been configured and reconfigured outside the Court in normal politics. Moore's excellent book (1996) is the closest equivalent to Griffin's work by a political scientist, in the sense that both are offering theoretical discussions of the political dimensions of American constitutionalism, and both argue for a view of constitutional politics as something that takes place mostly outside judicial institutions.…”

The Limits of Normalization: Taking Stock of theEU‐USComparative Literature

“…At the same time the parameters are open enough to define a broad version of positivism, which includes different schools of thought and research approaches so long as they accept the minimal principle of objective explanation. Some examples in this group are Goldstein's (1997; 2001) work on state resistance to central authority in early federations, Kelemen's (2000; 2004) research on the location and rigidity of environmental regulation, Joppke's () article on the sources of immigrant rights, Beramendi's (2007; 2012) work on redistribution in federal systems, Bolleyer's (; Bolleyer and Börzel, ) analysis of peripheral government coordination and Bomberg's () article on climate activism.…”

“…Prominent in this group are Shapiro's (1997) Goldstein's (1997; work on state resistance to central authority in early federations, Kelemen's (2000; research on the location and rigidity of environmental regulation, Joppke's (2001) article on the sources of immigrant rights, Beramendi's (2007; work on redistribution in federal systems, Bolleyer's (2009;Bolleyer and Börzel, 2010) analysis of peripheral government coordination and Bomberg's (2012) article on climate activism.…”

The formation of a European constitution: an approach from historical-political sociology

“…17, 231–32); see also Goldstein (2001, p. 13). On the anticipation of non-exclusive or decentralised sovereignty in the USA, see Goldstein (1997, p. 189). For seminal, although now somewhat dated, analysis, see Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler (1986, p. 23).…”