State Promotion and Regulation of the Telegraph Industry, 1845–1860

Nonnenmacher, Tomas

doi:10.1017/s0022050701025025

Cited by 23 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Nonnenmacher [2001] looks at the adoption of telegraph regulation circa 1850. Figure IV graphs total state population, measured in 1850 and on a log scale, versus the year of first telegraph regulation for each of the 32 U. S. states at the time.…”

Section: Iva Patterns Of Adoption: Occupation and Industry Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation

Mulligan

Shleifer

2005

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

179

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We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three implications of this model. First, jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it. Second, jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more. This implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions, and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U. S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states. We also find that the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations, as well as in civil law countries, where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower. Copyright (c) 2005 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Section: Iva Patterns Of Adoption: Occupation and Industry Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation

Mulligan

Shleifer

2005

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

179

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“…Nonnenmacher (2001) however argues that in the diffusion of the state regulation of the telegraph industry a cycle characterized by promotion followed by regulation was more important than quasirents considerations. 16 If we take election turnout as a proxy for the amount of information that voters possess, in Europe this turnout is highest for national elections, lower for regional elections and lowest for European Parliament elections (other European offices, such as the European Commission and the European Council, are not directly elected).…”

Section: Second Generation Studies: Information Commitment and Transmentioning

confidence: 98%

Electricity and telecoms reforms in the EU: Insights from the economics of federalism

Trillas

2010

Utilities Policy

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“…In particular, Neufeld (2008) shows that for US electricity regulation, quasi-rents due to specific investments were a more important determinant than monopoly rents in the decision to move from local to state regulation. 7 Nonnenmacher (2001), however, argues that in the diffusion of the state regulation of the telegraph industry a cycle characterized by promotion followed by regulation was more important than quasi-rents considerations.…”

Section: The Economics Of Federalism and Network Industriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications

Montolio

Trillas

2013

Information Economics and Policy

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We analyse the impact of regulation, industrial policy and jurisdictional allocation on broadband deployment using a theoretical model and an empirical estimation. Although central powers may be more focused and internalize interjurisdictional externalities, decentralized powers may internalize local horizontal policy spillovers and use a diversity of objectives as a commitment device in the presence of sunk investments. The latter may, for instance, alleviate the collective action problem of the joint use of rights of way and other physical infrastructures. In the empirical exercise, using data for OECD and EU countries for the period 1999-2006, we examine whether centralization promotes new telecommunications markets, in particular the broadband access market. The existing literature, in the main, claims it does, but we find no support for this claim in our data. Our results show that indicators of national industrial policy are a weakly positive determinant of broadband deployment and that different measures of centralization are either irrelevant or have a negative impact on broadband penetration. JEL Codes: L50, L96, K23, H77

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State Promotion and Regulation of the Telegraph Industry, 1845–1860

Cited by 23 publications

References 12 publications

The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation

The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation

Electricity and telecoms reforms in the EU: Insights from the economics of federalism

Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications

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