State Ownership and the Evolution of Italian Corporate Governance

Diversity of Institutional Investors and Foreign Blockholdings in France: The Evolution of an Institutionally Hybrid Economy

“…Credible commitments, including support for effective information sharing, reputational monitoring, sanctioning, and inter‐firm collaboration, is often important for the successful coordination of activities in institutionally hybrid market economies, and the social capital of CEOs plays a crucial role in forming such credible commitments among economic actors. Moreover, high levels of social capital in institutionally hybrid economies can serve as a source of leverage for elite/insider CEOs in coalition formation inside and outside the firm as well as dealing with state officials (Barca & Trento, 1997; Lukauskas, 1994; Schmidt, 1996; Suleiman, 1978; for a more general overview, see also Useem, 1979).…”

“…Insensitive response of such CEOs towards firm performance may be a more serious concern for foreign investors in the case of hybrid market economies. The high levels of social capital of elite CEOs have enabled them to enjoy greater protection from layoffs and hostile takeover bids through interlocking directorates and cross‐share ownership (Aguilera, 1998; Barca & Trento, 1997; Nguyen, 2009a). In short, as social capital of CEOs in hybrid market economies has negative effects on interests of foreign institutional investors, we expect foreign investors are less likely to target CEOs with high level of social capital.…”

“…The influence of the state in the coordination of activities among economic actors has served as a mechanism aimed at compensating for the presence of low trust (Burt, Hogarth, & Michaud, 2000; Lee & Yoo, 2008). As a result, dense linkage between tightly integrated large private and state‐owned corporations is an important feature of corporate networks in these economies, in turn, increases the importance of top corporate executives having access to the government (Barca & Trento, 1997; Ferraro et al., 2012; Windolf, 2002:77–96). Moreover, the prominent role of the state testifies to the importance of the social capital of CEOs relying on interpersonal relations to acquire valuable information.…”

State-Business Relations and Improvement of Corporate Governance in Russia

“…In this context, another comparison is interesting, namely, that with postwar Italy. The critical analysis of state ownership and the evolution of Italian corporate governance since World War II were presented in a paper by Barca & Trento (1997). They concluded that the fullscale or majority state ownership of corporations can be effective in separating ownership and control during stages of accelerated growth as well as when shifts in the sectoral balance are needed.…”

Productivity and profitability analysis of large Italian companies: 1998–2002

“…In recent years both economic analysis and the industrial policy debate have paid close attention to large Italian companies (at least 250 employees) (Barca and Trento 1997;Traù 1999Traù , 2004Istat 2005).…”