State‐of‐the‐art research on electromagnetic information security

Hayashi, Yu-ichi

doi:10.1002/2016rs006034

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…These techniques have been widely explored in the domain of information security for several decades. Among various potential use cases of EM-SCA, the most widely explored objective is the retrieval of cryptographic keys from computing devices while they are performing data encryption operations [13], [14]. Additionally, large scale monitoring of IoT devices; detecting deviations of program behaviour; and identification of malicious modifications to software and firmware are examples of other application of EM-SCA [9], [15].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis for IoT Forensics: Challenges, Framework, and Datasets

Sayakkara

Le-Khac

2021

IEEE Access

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Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel radiation from Internet of Things (IoT) devices are shown to be effective at acquiring forensic insights during digital investigations. These EM radiation patterns can be analysed with the help of machine learning algorithms to detect internal behaviours of IoT devices, which can be relevant to an investigation. However, the real-world application of EM sidechannel analysis for digital forensic purposes is obstructed by the lack of suitable tools and the technical expertise among law-enforcement communities. Although certain frameworks, such as EMvidence, exist to cater this requirement, the sheer diversity of the IoT ecosystem makes it difficult to support a sufficiently large collection of devices that are commonly encountered in forensic investigations. The work presented in this paper makes multiple contributions towards addressing this problem. Initially, a detailed discussion on the challenges of applying EM side-channel analysis in practical digital forensic purposes is provided, where the practical difficulties are illustrated. Then, it was shown that the existing EM side-channel analysis frameworks, such as EMvidence, can be used to overcome the diversity of IoT devices in forensics by equipping them with extensible plug-ins targeting the internal system-on-chips (SoC) of each device type. These plug-ins are expected to incorporate trained machine learning models, which are capable of recognising patterns of specific IoT device SoCs. However, the development of such plug-ins requires sufficiently diverse EM datasets from IoT devices. Facilitating this requirement, this work presents a comprehensive EM side-channel dataset representing a diverse collection of popular IoT devices and smartphones. The presented dataset is used to demonstrate the potential usage of machine learning models to recognise device behaviour.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis for IoT Forensics: Challenges, Framework, and Datasets

Sayakkara

Le-Khac

2021

IEEE Access

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“…The general concept is that the employed square wave signaling of the clock signal contains many harmonics which are emitted in the far-field due to the rapid change in current. These harmonics contain high frequencies which will act as carrier waves on which transmitted and processed data is induced [4], [21]. The content of the leaked emanations is strongly determined by how the video information is processed and transmitted [22]- [24].…”

Section: Modulation Of Captured Video Leakages In the Far-fieldmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions

Meulemeester

Scheers

Vandenbosch

2020

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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Video display units (VDUs) using differential signaling technology significantly increase the risk of compromising video information security through leakage emissions. This paper shows that differential signaling cables act as substantial video leakage sources. A concept is proposed which explains the video leakage principles of VDUs using differential signal cables such as the HDMI (high-definition multimedia interface) cable, DVI (digital visual interface) cable and the LVDS (low-voltage differential signaling) cable. The emanations of the LVDS cable are closely examined by measuring simultaneously the differential video signal on the LVDS lines and its near-and far-field leakage emissions. From these measurements several conclusions are drawn which give new insights into the video eavesdropping risk of VDUs using differential signaling methods. Furthermore, a novel video image reconstruction method is proposed which exploits the compromising emanations of a video display unit (VDU) by using frequency demodulation techniques. This paper shows that leaked video emanations of VDUs using differential signaling cables are not only amplitude modulated (AM) but also frequency modulated (FM). This strongly implies that the possible algorithmic toolset of malicious video eavesdroppers is much larger than currently assumed. This paper investigates several VDU setups at a distance of 10 meters, including an ultra-high-definition video display, three different HDMI cables and two notebooks. Additionally, the AM-based and FM-based video image reconstruction results are discussed and compared.

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“…The term electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) refers to a device's unintentional EM emissions that can affect the functionality of other devices and the health of humans who are exposed to it [27]. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the European Union (EU) are examples of authorities concerned with EMC [88,89]. However, regarding the question of EM side-channel information leakage from general purpose electronic devices, there are no such rules to govern the manufacturers.…”

Section: Standards and Toolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey of electromagnetic side-channel attacks and discussion on their case-progressing potential for digital forensics

Sayakkara

Le-Khac

Scanlon

2019

Digital Investigation

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The increasing prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has made it inevitable that their pertinence to digital forensic investigations will increase into the foreseeable future. These devices produced by various vendors often posses limited standard interfaces for communication, such as USB ports or WiFi/Bluetooth wireless interfaces. Meanwhile, with an increasing mainstream focus on the security and privacy of user data, built-in encryption is becoming commonplace in consumer-level computing devices, and IoT devices are no exception. Under these circumstances, a significant challenge is presented to digital forensic investigations where data from IoT devices needs to be analysed.This work explores the electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis literature for the purpose of assisting digital forensic investigations on IoT devices. EM side-channel analysis is a technique where unintentional electromagnetic emissions are used for eavesdropping on the operations and data handling of computing devices. The non-intrusive nature of EM side-channel approaches makes it a viable option to assist digital forensic investigations as these attacks require, and must result in, no modification to the target device. The literature on various EM side-channel analysis attack techniques are discussed -selected on the basis of their applicability in IoT device investigation scenarios. The insight gained from the background study is used to identify promising future applications of the technique for digital forensic analysis on IoT devices -potentially progressing a wide variety of currently hindered digital investigations.

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State‐of‐the‐art research on electromagnetic information security

Cited by 14 publications

References 14 publications

Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis for IoT Forensics: Challenges, Framework, and Datasets

Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis for IoT Forensics: Challenges, Framework, and Datasets

Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions

A survey of electromagnetic side-channel attacks and discussion on their case-progressing potential for digital forensics

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