State Legislative Redistricting: The Effectiveness of Traditional Districting Principles in the 2010 Wave

Theories of partisan redistricting postulate unitary actors maximizing their party’s expected seat share. Yet, the partition of a fixed supply of friendly voters necessarily implies a tragedy of the commons. We recast partisan redistricting as a bargaining game among the sitting representatives of the party controlling the map. The status quo is the threat point, explaining why changes are frequently minor. This bargaining framework implies that highly competitive districts will receive more help from redistricting if they are already represented by the party in charge. Employing a regression discontinuity design with precinct-level data, we find support for this prediction. (JEL C78, D72)

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State Legislative Redistricting: The Effectiveness of Traditional Districting Principles in the 2010 Wave

Cited by 3 publications

References 38 publications

Legislative redistricting and the partisan distribution of transportation expenditure

Legislative redistricting and the partisan distribution of transportation expenditure

Representing People and Places: Castaway Voters and the Racial Disparity in Redistricting

Gerrymandering in State Legislatures: Frictions from Axiomatic Bargaining

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