State Electric Utility Regulation: Financial Issues, Influences, and Trends

Hyman, Leonard S.; Habicht, Ernst R.

doi:10.1146/annurev.eg.11.110186.001115

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 2 publications

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“…Bypass can take the fonn of self-generation or cogeneration, fuel switching, or non-utility installation of energy conservation measures. This is predominantly a problem for a utility when, large electricity purchasers threaten to do any of the above, because a large revenue Joss will increase costs for customers remaining in the system (Hyman, 1986). Under th~ threat of system bypass, DSM programs or lower rates may be offered to customers t.o…”

Section: Puc Profit Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants and Impacts of Demand-side Management Program Investment of Electric Utilities

Degens¹

2000

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Section: Puc Profit Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants and Impacts of Demand-side Management Program Investment of Electric Utilities

Degens¹

2000

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Diversification, Deregulation, and Competition: Cost of Capital Implications for Electric Utilities

Hyman¹,

West²

1989

Deregulation and Diversification of Utilities

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Activist Protest Spillovers into the Regulatory Domain: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Nuclear Power Generation Industry

Fremeth

Holburn

Piazza

2022

Organization Science

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We examine how social activism—in the form of public protests against contentious business practices—can spill over into the regulatory domain, extending beyond activists’ articulated goals to affect firms’ regulatory outcomes in areas that are not directly targeted. We argue that firms are likely to experience broader regulatory repercussions after activist protests because public contention invites greater scrutiny of firm behavior by industry regulators, increasing the likelihood that instances of organizational noncompliance will be discovered. Protests can also cause regulators to evaluate targeted firms more negatively in regulatory assessments, especially firms with less favorable preexisting reputations or stakeholder relations, and to tighten regulations on nontargeted issues that signal their commitment to safeguarding the public interest. We further contend that the political context within which regulatory agencies operate shapes the extent of protest spillovers: When political institutions are aligned with activist goals, and when regulators are ideologically sympathetic too, protests have a more pronounced negative impact on firms’ regulatory outcomes in nontargeted domains. We find robust support for our predictions in a statistical analysis of the impact of antinuclear protests—which sought to block nuclear power plant development by electric utilities—on utilities’ subsequent regulated financial rates of return on their assets. Our analysis contributes new insights to research on the indirect consequences for targeted organizations of social activism.

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State Electric Utility Regulation: Financial Issues, Influences, and Trends

Cited by 3 publications

References 2 publications

Determinants and Impacts of Demand-side Management Program Investment of Electric Utilities

Determinants and Impacts of Demand-side Management Program Investment of Electric Utilities

Diversification, Deregulation, and Competition: Cost of Capital Implications for Electric Utilities

Activist Protest Spillovers into the Regulatory Domain: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Nuclear Power Generation Industry

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