State‐Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters

Abstract

This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.”

External Actors, State‐Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction

“…Second, state‐building efforts that proceed from contracting (by delegation, see Matanock 2014, or by interstate agreements, see Börzel and van Hüllen 2014) are more likely to be successful. At a minimum, contracting makes input legitimacy much more likely because the political elites governing the country must positively agree to terms.…”

“…In the Solomon Islands, the success of RAMSI enhanced support among the population, putting pressure on national elites to keep to their original bargain (Matanock 2014). In Georgia, Saakashvili embraced EU programs because anticorruption was a key element of his appeal to the electorate (Börzel and van Hüllen 2014).…”

“…External actors operate under agreement with state authorities, although the discretion they enjoy and the ability of the state to monitor them will vary. The Börzel and van Hüllen (2014) discussion of EU efforts to reduce corruption in the Southern Caucasus is a case of enhancing state capacity where the external actors transfer resources and knowledge but do not have legal authority. The leverage of the EU was limited.…”

“…International legitimation matters, but only to a limited degree. This points to the third source of legitimacy, the congruence or compatibility of international norms with domestically held norms or moral beliefs (Börzel and van Hüllen 2014; Hönke and Thauer 2014). National and/or local actors and communities are the critical players with regard to the acceptance of the activities of external actors as legitimate and appropriate.…”

Accounting for diverging paths in most similar cases: corruption in Baltics and Caucasus

“…Success against corruption has been marginal even though work has been done for the sake of simplifying licensing procedures, business regulations, and administration of tax and customs. Many corrupt officials have been sacked in the tax department, customs service and police; however personnel changeover has lacked consistency and thoroughness and hence has been regarded as merely symbolic [71][72][73]). In November 2012 an address to the Cabinet President Tigran Sargysyan admitted failure in the struggle against corruption and announced intention to employ more surgical methods against corruption [74].…”