State breakdown and Army-Splinter Rebellions

Abstract

In Afghanistan, Libya, Liberia and beyond, armed rebellions have begun when armies fell apart. When does this occur? This paper conducts a large-N analysis of these army-splinter rebellions, distinct from both non-military rebellions from below and from coups, using new data. It finds that they follow a logic of state breakdown focusing on regime characteristics (personalist regimes and the loss of superpower support at the end of the Cold War) rather than drivers of mass mobilization from below. In contrast, these regime-level factors matter much less for the non-military rebellions from below that dominate theorizing about civil war origins. This paper also shows that one option for military rebels lies in not attempting a coup but instead heading straight into a rebellion. This paper thus distinguishes highly different paths to armed conflict, validates the state breakdown approach to why armies fall apart, and extends the well-known tradeoff between coups and civil wars.

Armed group formation in civil war: ‘Movement’, ‘insurgent’, and ‘state splinter’ origins

“…For example, rebellions that are not accompanied by coup attempts, which we include in 'state splinter' origins, are bloodier and shorter than those from below -'insurgent' and 'movement' cases, in our framework. 177 They are characterised by conventional warfare and are likely to be more severe in terms of battlefield than civilian deaths. 178 In turn, civil wars that emerge from coups, which are also among 'state splinters' , and revolutions, which are part of our category of 'movement' origins, are relatively short, and the overall casualties are significantly lower as compared to other civil wars, especially prolonged ones involving armed groups with 'insurgent' origins that manage to survive and continue their activities despite their power asymmetry in relation to the state.…”

Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War

“…Some of the most violent civil wars—e.g., the United States’ (1861–65), Spain’s (1936–39), Russia’s (1917–23), South Yemen’s (1986), the break-up of Yugoslavia (1991–95), Syria’s (2011-present)—have begun with the fragmentation of the state’s regular military. McLauchlin (2022) finds that from 1946–2013, 13% of intra-state conflicts have been “army-splinter rebellions”—conflicts that begin when a part of the state’s military breaks away and forms a rebel group (or comprises a large portion of it), and these conflicts tend to be bloodier and more complex.…”

“…These decisions have vital implications for the severity of civil war. Civil wars in which the military fragments are substantially bloodier than conflicts in which it remains unified (McLauchlin 2022). Military officers are experts in armed violence.…”

“…While there is a well-developed literature on rebel movement fragmentation and decision-making (Cunningham 2006; Cunningham 2013; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012), there is a significant gap in scholarly understanding of military fragmentation and the decision-making of individual officers at the start of civil war. This is a notable gap given the high level of violence that civil wars with military fragmentation see (McLauchlin 2022). This lack of understanding has real-world consequences.…”

Civil war as a social process: actors and dynamics from pre- to post-war

“…The focus on escalating state-society interactions also misses state challengers that emerge from within the regime as a result of coup d'état attempts (Roessler, 2016), army splinters not accompanied by coups (McLauchlin, 2022), and exclusion from the military (Harkness, 2018). In weak, ethnically divided states, Roessler (2016) illustrates, elites in the central government mobilize support from beyond their own ethnic base to extend the state's reach.…”