Stand-alone private antitrust damages: (how) should competition authorities react?

Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design

“…Existing theoretical and empirical research in law and economics provides important insights about the relative merits of private antitrust enforcement in institutionally sound environments such as the U.S. or the European Union (see, e.g., Elzinga 1974, 1985;Shughart 1990, Martini and Rovesti 2004, Segal and Whinston 2007, McAfee et al 2008, Bourjade et al 2009, Schwartz and Wickelgren 2011, Waksman 2012, Calcagno 2012, Peyer 2012, Rajabiun 2013, Hüschelrath and Peyer 2013, Cosnita-Langlais and Tropeano 2014, Feess 2015, Reuter 2015.…”

“…First, we add to the scant literature that explicitly contrasts public with private antitrust enforcement (e.g., Martini and Rovesti 2004, McAfee et al 2008, Segal and Whinston 2007, Calcagno 2012, Reuter 2015, Hüschelrath and Peyer 2013, Cosnita-Langlais and Tropeano 2014 by elucidating how the relative desirability of private antitrust enforcement as a complement to public enforcement is shaped by corruption, a pervasive phenomenon in many jurisdictions of the less-developed world. Second, we advance the growing comparative law and economics literature that stresses the fundamental importance of a society's political, legal, and economic conditions for the functioning of antitrust laws and policies in particular (see, e.g., Gal 2004, Kovacic 2001, Sokol 2010) and for institution-building more generally (see, e.g., Murrell 1992, Rodrik 2000, Berkowitz et al 2003, Djankov et al 2003.…”

Private Enforcement, Corruption, and Antitrust Design

“…Spurred by its prevalence in the U.S., policymakers across the world have been pondering the introduction of private antitrust enforcement as a complement to public enforcement (see, e.g., Kovacic 1995Kovacic , 2001Davidson 2005, Waller 2006, Fox and Crane 2010Gal 2010, Crane 2010. Existing theoretical and empirical research in law and economics provides important insights about the relative merits of private antitrust enforcement in institutionally sound environments such as the U.S. or the European Union (see, e.g., Elzinga 1974, 1985;Shughart 1990, Martini and Rovesti 2004, Segal and Whinston 2007, McAfee et al 2008, Bourjade et al 2009, Schwartz and Wickelgren 2011, Waksman 2012, Calcagno 2012, Peyer 2012, Rajabiun 2013, Hüschelrath and Peyer 2013, Cosnita-Langlais and Tropeano 2014, Feess 2015, Reuter 2015. 1 Existing research, however, provides limited guidance about the role of private antitrust enforcement in institutionally weak environments beset by ubiquitous corruption and recurrent subversion of justice; that is, the very conditions prevalent in many developing, emerging market, and transition economies (see, e.g., Rodriguez andWilliams 1994, Godek 1998, Ma 2010, El Dean and Mohieldin 2001, Sheth 1997, Fox 2007, Davidson 2005, Gal 2004Stephan 2010, Kovacic 1995, 1996, 1997, 2001…”

“…Our paper, therefore, makes three main contributions. First, we add to the scant literature that explicitly contrasts public with private antitrust enforcement (e.g., Martini and Rovesti 2004, McAfee et al 2008, Segal and Whinston 2007, Calcagno 2012, Reuter 2015, Hüschelrath and Peyer 2013, Cosnita-Langlais and Tropeano 2014 by elucidating how the relative desirability of private antitrust enforcement as a complement to public enforcement is shaped by corruption, a pervasive phenomenon in many jurisdictions of the less-developed world. Second, we advance the growing comparative law and economics literature that stresses the fundamental importance of a society's political, legal, and economic conditions for the functioning of antitrust laws and policies in particular (see, e.g., Gal 2004, Kovacic 2001, Sokol 2010) and for institution-building more generally (see, e.g., Murrell 1992, Rodrik 2000, Berkowitz et al 2003, Djankov et al 2003.…”