Stance empiricism and epistemic reason

Surovell, Jonathan

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1539-0

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…One position that takes the monist attitude even further and in fact borders on stance monism in principle as well as in practicethe first option above -is Jonathan Reid Surovell's (2019). Surovell defends what he calls 'stance empiricism', which for him is simply empiricism taken as a stance and of which van Fraassen's (and Carnap's) stances are instances.…”

Section: A Monist (In Principle and In Practice) Approach To Stance E...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting stance voluntarism: in defense of an active stance pluralism

Bhakthavatsalam

2023

Synthese

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Bas van Fraassen's stance voluntarism has raised the question of how to justify one's own stance choice if one is to follow the voluntarist dictum that all rational stances, i.e. all those that don't lead to 'self-sabotage by one's own lights', are equally rational. van Fraassen's response is that one justifies their stance choice based on one's own values, but the problem is that those values only appeal to holders of the said stance and not others. In this paper I propose a pragmatist approach to justifying stance choice. I argue that we can provide stance-transcendent justification for our choice of stance based on its stance-transcendent benefits. Consequently, multiple stances having stance-transcendent benefits should all be embraced as it is the epistemically virtuous thing to do. I advocate a move away from the standard voluntarist position of being a stance monist in practicei.e. defending and holding only one stancewhile acknowledging other rational stances only begrudgingly. I defend an active stance pluralism where we strive to actively hold different (apparently conflicting) stances depending on the context. Where that's not possible, I propose that we should at least enthusiastically encourage multiple stances (taken by others). In Section 1 I introduce epistemic stances via a discussion of stance empiricism and stance scientific realism. In Section 2 I discuss the problem of stance justification and explore a few different existing teleological proposals for stance choice. Finally in Section 3 based on numerous examples from science and philosophy, I argue for a pragmatic, active, normative stance pluralism. I conclude with some clarifications on the rationale behind active stance pluralism.

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Section: A Monist (In Principle and In Practice) Approach To Stance E...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting stance voluntarism: in defense of an active stance pluralism

Bhakthavatsalam

2023

Synthese

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“…Amanda Bryant has argued convincingly that, on Chakravartty's account, the "minimal standard of rationality is [itself] not beyond the reach of epistemic stances but vulnerable -like everything elseto their differential influence" (2021, p. 8). That is, rationality should be a stance-relative, rather than a stance-neutral constraint, and CSP therefore collapses into what Bryant calls "epistemic anarchy" or what I have called unbridled relativism (see also Baumann, 2011;Surovell, 2019;Kusch, 2020;Veigl, 2020 for similar arguments against van Fraassen's Stance Empiricism). Chakravartty recognises that limiting the constraint imposed by rationality to internal coherence opens the door to the possibility that more than one stance will count as rational… [A] question inevitably comes to the fore about whether this inherently permissive constraint is strong enough to rule out epistemically pathological stances (2017, p. 224).…”

Section: C1: Rationality As Internal Consistency/no Self-sabotagementioning

confidence: 99%

Stance Pluralism, Scientology, and the Problem of Relativism

Merwe

2022

Found Sci

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Inspired by Bas van Fraassen's Stance Empiricism, Anjan Chakravartty has developed a pluralistic account of what he calls epistemic stances towards scientific ontology. In this paper, I examine whether Chakravartty's stance pluralism can exclude epistemic stances that licence pseudo-scientific practices like those found in Scientology. I argue that it cannot. Chakravartty's stance pluralism is therefore prone to a form of debilitating relativism. I consequently argue that we need (1) some ground or constraint in relation to which epistemic stances can be ranked by degrees, and (2) some way to demarcate science from pseudoscience so that we know what epistemic stances are about. Regarding (1), I argue that empirical detectability can serve as the ground in relation to which epistemic stances are ranked by degrees. Regarding (2), I argue for ranking sciences on a continuum according to established institutional criteria, rather than attempting to draw a strict demarcation.

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Stance empiricism and epistemic reason

Cited by 2 publications

References 28 publications

Revisiting stance voluntarism: in defense of an active stance pluralism

Revisiting stance voluntarism: in defense of an active stance pluralism

Stance Pluralism, Scientology, and the Problem of Relativism

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