Stagnation of a 'Miracle': Botswana’s Governance Record Revisited

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Stagnation of a "Miracle": Botswana's Governance Record Revisited Abstract Botswana has been dubbed an "African miracle." The country has been praised not only for maintaining a multiparty system and high growth rates since independence but also for its good governance record. In contrast to other African countries, the extent of neopatrimonialism, which runs counter to good governance, is said to be low. This article aims to a) precisely assess Botswana's neopatrimonial profile and b) put forward explanations for the comparatively low level of neopatrimonialism and for the recent "stagnation of a miracle." The paper finds that there have always been neopatrimonial tendencies in Botswana, though they have been largely overlooked by mainstream analyses. The crucial difference is the limited nature of these tendencies relative to other African countries. This can be attributed to the independence period, characterized by the homogeneity of political, economic, and administrative interests in safeguarding private property rights through a "strong" rational-legal state, that is, by limiting neopatrimonialism. Financed by massive revenues stemming from diamonds, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the Bank of Botswana, the government of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) was able to secure its reign through the provision of public goods and limited neopatrimonial exchange relations. However, due to decreasing electoral dominance and elite cohesion, the ruling party is now reverting to some neopatrimonial and authoritarian means in order to safeguard its rule. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: neopatrimonialism, corruption, governance, institutions, interests, development, Botswana Dr. Christian von Soest is a political scientist and a senior research fellow at the GIGA Institute of African Studies. Contact:soest@giga-hamburg.

Combating corruption in Botswana: lessons for policy makers

“…A third weakness is the absence of any obligation of ministers, MPs and judges to declare their assets, and to suspend or revoke their ownership where a potential conflict of interest may arise (von Soest, 2009, pp. 16-17; Badham-Jones, 2014, p. 3; Baatweng, 2015).…”

“…They may exercise behind-the-scenes influence on public services, contracts, appointments and judicial matters. During his research, Sebudubudu was informed of a powerful informal group that actively wielded behind-the-scenes influence, and remained unaccountable to any institution (2014, p. 16; von Soest, 2009, pp. 16-18).…”

Regimes, constituencies and the politics of state formation: Zimbabwe and Botswana compared

“…First, in comparative rankings of ‘good governance’ (such as those compiled by the World Bank, UNDP and Transparency International) Botswana is consistently given high rankings (Robinson and Parsons, 2006; World Bank, 1984). Second, using three empirical indicators of patrimonialism (concentration of power with the leader, provision of personal favours and misuse of state resources), von Soest (2009) has shown that although elements of patrimonialism can be found in Botswana, it has been restricted and less widespread than in other African countries. Further, the number of ministries and turnover of ministers and senior administrative staff have been limited.…”