Stackelburg solution for two-person games with biased information patterns

Chen, C.; Cruz, J.B.

doi:10.1109/tac.1972.1100179

Cited by 194 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The field of dynamic game theory offers potential benefits in the design and analysis of such systems (Isaacs 1955, Basar and Cruz 1982, Basar and Olsder 1998, Starr and Ho 1969a, Starr and Ho 1969b, Chen and Cruz 1972, Simaan and Cruz 1973a-c, Cruz 1975, Castanon and Athans 1976. Macroeconomics has completely adopted concepts from dynamic game theory.…”

Section: Networked Dynamic Control Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Control of Networked Systems Containing Multiple Agents

Cruz¹,

Tangonan

Tan

et al. 2010

Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Informatics in Control, Automation and Robotics

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Abstract:This position paper illustrates the use of a natural framework for the modelling, analysis, and design of engineering systems that involve two or more controllers, each of which has an associated objective function. Such systems arise when ordinary single controller systems are networked through communication links so that the information available to each controller may contain aspects of the other systems' states and the optimization of each objective function is no longer decoupled from each other. Single controller optimization is no longer directly applicable. Appropriate to the study of such systems is the theory of games that has been developing in mathematics, economics, and engineering for the past 60 years. There are extensive applications in economics, but in engineering the applications are scarce. In recent years, there has been great attention to global problems such as the negative environmental impact of energy use, and global warming. These problems arise from complex systems with multiple controllers. Among the approaches for dealing with the problems, there should be one on a total systems approach with a game theory base. A natural framework for this is the subject of this policy paper.

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Section: Networked Dynamic Control Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Control of Networked Systems Containing Multiple Agents

Cruz¹,

Tangonan

Tan

et al. 2010

Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Informatics in Control, Automation and Robotics

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“…Our work is based on Stackelberg [10], who has built a model in 1934 for the market behavior when there is a leader firm. Chen [11] and Simaan [12] have built the mathematical model for Stackelberg problems in the field of game theory. Shubik [13] has written a review on the application of game theory in economics.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using the Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium to Deduce the Effect of Government Subsidy on Consumption Rates and Prices

Amer¹,

Kattan²

2015

ijacsa

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Abstract-Governments are interested in inducing positive habits and behaviors in its citizens and discouraging ones that are harmful to the individual or to the society. Taxation and legislation are usually used to discourage negative behaviors. Subsidy seems the politically correct way to encourage positive behaviors. In this paper, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is used to deduce the effect of the government subsidy on the user consumption, prices and producer and distributor profits.

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“…After that moment a rapid development and intensive investigation of these problems begun both in theoretical and in applications oriented directions [2,3,4,5,6]. However, bilevel decision making may involve many uncertain factors in a real world problem.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Granule Sets Based Bilevel Decision Model

Zheng

Zhang

et al. 2006

Rough Sets and Knowledge Technology

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Abstract. Bilevel decision addresses the problem in which two levels of decision makers act and react in an uncooperative, sequential manner, and each tries to optimize their individual objectives under constraints. Such a bilevel optimization structure appears naturally in many aspects of planning, management and policy making. There are two kinds of bilevel decision models already presented, which are traditional bilevel decision models and rule sets based bilevel decision models. Based on the two kinds of models, granule sets based bilevel decision models are developed in this paper. The models can be viewed as extensions of the former two models, and they can describe more bilevel decision making problems and possess some new advantages. We also discuss the comparison of the three models and present some new topics in this research field.

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Stackelburg solution for two-person games with biased information patterns

Cited by 194 publications

References 6 publications

Control of Networked Systems Containing Multiple Agents

Control of Networked Systems Containing Multiple Agents

Using the Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium to Deduce the Effect of Government Subsidy on Consumption Rates and Prices

Granule Sets Based Bilevel Decision Model

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