Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory 2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-27335-8_26-1
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Stackelberg Routing on Parallel Transportation Networks

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Cited by 17 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…We can then write the latency as a function of vehicle flow as well as a binary argument s i , which indicates whether the road is congested [23], [30]: congested. An equilibrium has an associated equilibrium latency experienced by all selfish users.…”
Section: A Function Of the Density (N Hmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…We can then write the latency as a function of vehicle flow as well as a binary argument s i , which indicates whether the road is congested [23], [30]: congested. An equilibrium has an associated equilibrium latency experienced by all selfish users.…”
Section: A Function Of the Density (N Hmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As shown in Fig. 2, equilibria may have one road in free-flow and rest congested, or all may be congested [23], [30].…”
Section: Human Driver Choice Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…While the focus on parallel road networks may appear restrictive, such networks are of theoretical and practical significance. For instance, Pigou's network [9], a two-arc parallel network, has been used extensively in the selfish routing literature to study price of anarchy bounds [10] and more general parallel networks have been used to study Stackelberg routing strategies [11]. More broadly, analogues of parallel networks have been considered in several online resource allocation problems, including online knapsack [12] and job scheduling [13].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%