Stackelberg-Game-Based Dynamic Spectrum Access in Heterogeneous Wireless Systems

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate a two-stage Stackelberg game for dynamic spectrum access (DSA) in cognitive radio networks using a leader [spectrum provider (SP)] subgame and a follower [secondary user (SU)] subgame. Our research distinguishes itself in a number of ways. First, a two-stage Stackelberg game has been proposed to provide a unique optimal solution that facilitates a tradeoff between quality of service (QoS) of unlicensed SUs and revenue of SPs. Second, comprehensive budget and QoS constraints imposed by the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio are defined to fully take into account QoS requirements. Third, a necessary condition and closed form for the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium are presented for multiradio multichannel DSA. Analytical and simulation studies are carried out to assess the performance of the proposed game, and the numerical results verify that the proposed approach reaches the unique Stackelberg equilibrium.Index Terms-Cognitive radio network (CRN), dynamic spectrum access (DSA), game theory, quality of service (QoS) in multiradio cognitive networks.

Shannon meets Stackelberg on the cognitive interference channel part I: A deterministic view

“…In the following, few works that implement Stackelberg game on the CIC (or cognitive radio network) is considered. In Reference 21, a two‐stage Stackelberg game for dynamic spectrum access in cognitive radio network using leader (spectrum provider) sub‐game and follower (secondary user) sub‐game has been proposed. The problem is to provide a unique optimal solution that facilitates trade‐off between Quality‐of‐Service (QoS) of unlicensed secondary users and revenue of spectrum providers.…”

Location-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Traffic Offloading in Heterogeneous Networks: A Stackelberg Game Approach

“…One of the main advantages of deploying small cells (SCs) in heterogeneous networks (HetNets) is that they can help traffic offloading and provide better service for macrocell users (MUES) [ 1 , 2 , 3 ]. However, since SCs have dedicated small cell users (SUEs) to serve, they will not be helpful willingly and the macrocell base station (MBS) has to provide some reward to incentivize them [ 4 ]. The location of SCs has a great impact on the traffic offloading process.…”