Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies

Bloch, Francis; Ghosal, Sayantan

doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.2266

Cited by 31 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This model is developed and specified based on the frameworks in previous research on bilateral oligopoly including Azzam (1996), Gabszewicz and Michel (1997), Bloch and Ghosal (1997), Maude-Griffin et al (2004), and Dickson and Hartley (2013).…”

Section: Bilateral Oligopoly Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Measuring Bilateral Market Power in International Markets of Vertically Differentiated Agricultural Commodities

Yamaura

Xia

2015

Journal of Agricultural &Amp; Food Industrial Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Two features of international markets of agricultural commodities are bilateral market power of exporting and importing countries and the coexistence of non-genetically modified (non-GM) and genetically modified (GM) products. The two features were not taken into account in most extant studies on market power in international agricultural commodity markets. This research develops a bilateral oligopoly model with the interaction between non-GM and GM commodity and conducts an empirical estimation for U.S.-Japan soybean trade. The estimation results show that U.S. exporters and Japanese importers are almost equally sharing the dominance of market power. The analysis in this research provides new measures of market power and improves the understanding on world soybean markets.

show abstract

Section: Bilateral Oligopoly Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The relative price that clears both markets is the ratio of aggregate offers of two commodities. Bloch and Ghosal (1997) analyzed the incentives to form trading groups in a bilateral oligopoly. Only when all agents trade on the same market, the trading structure is strongly stable.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring Bilateral Market Power in International Markets of Vertically Differentiated Agricultural Commodities

Yamaura

Xia

2015

Journal of Agricultural &Amp; Food Industrial Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…but has the disadvantage that the "stable equilibrium" is suppoI1ed by certain beliefs about what would happen following a deviation from equilibrium, and those beliefs are not "rational", so the stable equilibrium is not subgame perfect. Recent alternative approaches to modeling cartel stability, which address this problem, include Chatterjee et al (1993), Bloch and Ghosal (1994), and Ray and Vohra (1994). Our other reason for analyzing the modest lEA rather than the Nash equilibrium to an asymmeuic game is even more practical: we can do one but not the other.…”

Section: The Basic Approach To Analyzing An Leamentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics and Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements

Karp

Sacheti

1998

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfal"e of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of freeriding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfarc. For global pollution problems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a suecessful lEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-tiding may disappeaT. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful lEA. The effect of an lEA is sensitive to differences between the duration of the lEA and agents' planning horizon. JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F42, Q28

show abstract

“…A (strategic) price is calculated at the trading post; we take it to be the ratio of the aggregate bid to aggregate offer, and allocations are determined by executing trades at this rate of exchange. Bloch and Ghosal (1997), studying stable trading structures, examined uniqueness and comparative statics of interior Nash equilibria of this game under the additional assumption that a common utility function can be used to describe preferences of all players (both buyers and sellers). The full symmetry assumptions were relaxed in Bloch and Ferrer (2001) in their discussion of trade fragmentation, but these authors proved only existence of non-trivial equilibria.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%