Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

Watanabe, Naoki; Muto, Shigeo

doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9

Cited by 37 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…On the other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyses bargaining between a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. More recent work analyzes market structure and technology improvement.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidizing New Technology Adoption in a Stackelberg Duopoly: Cases of Substitutes and Complements

Hattori

Tanaka

2016

Ital Econ J

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Economic growth requires that firms adopt new technologies. However, it may be insufficient in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this case, a government subsidy is necessary. We present an analysis of firms' adoption of new technology and government subsidization policy in a Stackelberg duopoly with differentiated goods. The technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost, such as training employees. There are several cases related to optimal policies depending on the set-up costs and whether the goods are substitutes or complements. In particular, there are two cases.1. Social welfare is maximized when only the Stackelberg leader adopts the new technology, but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should subsidize only the leader, which is a discriminatory policy. (Case 5 of Theorem 1 and Case 3-(1)-ii of Theorem 2) 2. Social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt the new technology, but only the leader adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should subsidize only the follower. This policy is not discriminatory because adoption is the dominant strategy for the leader. (Case 2 of Theorem 1)

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidizing New Technology Adoption in a Stackelberg Duopoly: Cases of Substitutes and Complements

Hattori

Tanaka

2016

Ital Econ J

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“…We view each negotiation procedure as an alternating offers Rubinstein (1982) framework in which the patent holders may be placed in groups to be negotiated simultaneously or sequentially. Recently, a cooperative bargaining approach has been taken to patent licensing by Tauman and Watanabe (2007) and Watanabe and Muto (2008); however, Kishimoto and Muto (2008) state that the non-cooperative alternating offers framework is most appropriate for patent licensing. 1 Our analysis conforms to a "1-N" pattern in which the production unit makes the first proposal in all negotiations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Fragmented property rights and royalty bargaining

Clark

Péreau

2009

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Some other studies are worthy of mention, for example, Watanabe and Muto (2008), Boone (2001), Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Pal (2010), Elberfeld and Nti (2004), Zhang, Mei and Zhong (2014), Hattori and Tanaka (2014) and (2015) and Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

License or entry with vertical differentiation in duopoly

Hattori¹,

Tanaka

2016

Econom. bus. letters

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We consider choice of options for a foreign innovating firm to license its technology for producing the high quality good to a domestic firm, or to enter the market of the domestic country with or without license. Under the assumption of uniform distribution about taste parameters of consumers; when cost functions are linear, if the low quality good's quality is sufficiently high, license without entry strategy is optimum; if the low quality good's quality is low, both of entry without license strategy and license without entry strategy are optimum; when cost functions are quadratic, if the high quality good's quality is high, license without entry strategy is optimum; if the high quality good's quality is low, entry with license strategy is optimum.

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Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

Abstract: Licensing, Coalition structure, Bargaining set, Core, C71, D45, D43,

Cited by 37 publications

References 23 publications

Subsidizing New Technology Adoption in a Stackelberg Duopoly: Cases of Substitutes and Complements

Subsidizing New Technology Adoption in a Stackelberg Duopoly: Cases of Substitutes and Complements

Fragmented property rights and royalty bargaining

License or entry with vertical differentiation in duopoly

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