Stable Instability in France

How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies

“…Although this finding obviously concerns only one policy area, it underlines the need for careful thought about whether the average level of government instability in a country affects political performance there. Indeed, although scholars frequently talk of instability as if it is a problem that plagues particular countries or regimes, specialists of the most unstable systems (Italy and Fourth Republic France) have often questioned the extent to which instability actually creates policymaking problems (e.g., Dogan 1989;Sartori 1994;Siegfried 1956). Consistent with the doubts raised by these specialists, the results presented here indicate that on average, countries with higher levels of partisan instability in governing coalitions or partisan portfolio volatility find ways to solve problems that instability and volatility can create.…”

“…The "Italian" version, for instance, argues that there are coalition formulae that last for a long time, providing a core of party leaders who can resolve disputes and push necessary legislation through parliament, regardless of the number of cabinet resignations that may occur over the life of a particular formulae (Dogan 1989;LaPalombara 1987;Sports and Wieser 1986;Siegfried 1956 develops a similar argument about the French Fourth Republic). Suleiman (1974), to take another example, argues that continuity in the partisan composition of the government in France is important because it gives individual ministers the backing they need to deal with civil servants during policy formulation and implementation.…”

“…Among researchers who treat cabinet stability as a measure of political performance areLinz (1978),Powell (1982), and Strom (1990). Scholars who argue that there is no explicit link between cabinet instability (broadly defined) and political performance includeLijphart (1984a),Sartori (1994),Siegfried (1956), andTaylor and Herman (1971).…”

The duration and durability of cabinet ministers

“…These very cursory theoretical remarks on the relation between cabinet stability and ministerial stability meet with the empirical findings: Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008: 169) show that ministerial stability 'is only loosely related to the stability of cabinets'. Ministers remaining in portfolio with a changing government enables stability in an ostensibly unstable cabinet -a feature of interwar politics in Belgium (Höjer, 1969: 315) and the French Fourth Republic (Siegfried, 1956). Dogan (1989) provides an extensive historical comparison of 12 European regimes in terms of the relationship between cabinet stability and ministerial turnover, arguing that groups of irremovable ministers often ensure the continuity of state leadership.…”

Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work

“…Lijphart differentiates his approach from what he calls the "prevalent" point of view according to which "cabinet durability is an indicator not just of the cabinet's strength compared with that of the legislature but also of regime stability" (1999: 129). Lijphart cites Warwick's theory as an example of this point of view 70 and contrasts this approach with Siegfried's (1956) and Dogan's (1989) The average of these two measures is produced in Lijphart's (1999) Table 7.1, but there are some additional steps necessary for the creation of the "index of executive dominance." Here is the description of the rest of the process: "Two important adjustments are required to translate the averages in the third column of Table 7.1 into a satisfactory index of executive dominance.…”