Stability of the Evolutionary Game System and Control Strategies of Behavior Instability in Coal Mine Safety Management

Wang, Xinhua; Lu, Rongwu; Yu, Hao; Li, Dan

doi:10.1155/2019/6987427

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(31 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, the involved game participants are different; some games occur between coal mines, and some occur between coal mines and miners. ere are relatively few papers on tripartite games [30][31][32]. e content of existing work has some drawbacks, and there has been a lack of rigorous mathematical demonstration [33,34].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Zhou

Tang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Zhou

Tang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In terms of the game problem between the stakeholders in the production system of a coal mine, Lu and Wang conducted relevant research on the fractional supervision game model [24], the multiple evolution game model [25], the stability of the evolution game system [26], and the evolution dynamics model based on the delay and impulsive differential equation [27]. Furthermore, some authors have analyzed the dynamic process of a multiplayer game in a coal mine safety supervision system [28][29][30].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior Choice of Game Parties under the Interference of Cognition in the Game between Coal Miners and Supervisors

Wang²,

Wang

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the game between coal miners and supervisors, the behavior choices of the game parties will be affected by cognitive factors. The analysis of the behavior choices of coal miners and supervisors under the influence of cognitive factors is helpful for the design of violation behavior control strategies. Firstly, a description method of subjective cognition based on the mathematical method of quantum theory is designed. Secondly, taking the subjective cognition of coal miners and supervisors as a random variable, a behavior evolution model with random variables is constructed. Thirdly, the impact of subjective cognition on the behavior choices of coal miners and supervisors is analyzed. Finally, the violation behavior control strategy is designed. It is found that when the violation probability decreases to a certain extent, the probability of supervision will change from the increase to decrease. When the probability of supervision decreases to a certain extent, the violation probability will change from the decrease to increase. Fluctuations in cognitive state can affect the change process of violation probability and supervision probability. The behavior control strategy designed according to the behavior evolution model can control the violation behavior in the situation of cognitive state fluctuation.

show abstract

“…As a controlling method of unsafe behaviors, CMSM has already attracted many scholars' attention [6][7][8][9][10]. Based on the theoretical analysis of the evolutionary stability strategy, we have already put forward some incentive measures and restraint measures to control the instability of player's dynamical behaviors in CMSM [11]. It is found that game strategy selection is controllable under the corresponding measures, and appropriate incentive and constraint measures can mobilize the initiative of safe behaviors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Stability Analysis of the Coal Mine Safety Management System Governed by Delay and Impulsive Differential Equations

Bai

Wang

et al. 2020

Complexity

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Control of unsafe behaviors has always been a difficult point in Coal Mine Safety Management (CMSM). To study the regular pattern of behavior propagations in CMSM, a series of evolutionary dynamical system models are established by the delay and impulsive differential equations (DIDEs). The threshold constraints (TCs) and impulse responses in the models can accurately correspond to the actual inspection and supervision measures in safety management. Through the simulation analysis and comparison of the system stability, it can be concluded that some proper settings of the TCs and impulse responses bring satisfactory evolutionary stability. Based on the main results of this study, we put forward some decision-making suggestions on the control points and control strategies of unsafe behaviors in safety management.

show abstract

Stability of the Evolutionary Game System and Control Strategies of Behavior Instability in Coal Mine Safety Management

Cited by 12 publications

References 27 publications

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Behavior Choice of Game Parties under the Interference of Cognition in the Game between Coal Miners and Supervisors

Evolutionary Stability Analysis of the Coal Mine Safety Management System Governed by Delay and Impulsive Differential Equations

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About