“Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System

Kou, Chien-wen; Tsai, Wen-Hsuan

doi:10.1086/674558

Cited by 113 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In contrast, the national average is 8, 3, 7, and 7 years (Sohu ). Furthermore, in the 14 cases, the average promotion age to deputy section chief till division chief is 23.1, 25.6, 29.1, and 30 years, respectively, whereas the expected age of promotion under personnel regulation is 30, 35, 40, and 45 years (Kou and Tsai ).…”

Section: Case Findings and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crowding Out Meritocracy? – Cultural Constraints in Chinese Public Human Resource Management

Zhang

2015

Aust J Public Adm

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This paper seeks cultural explanations of the pervasive norm violations against the principle of meritocracy in Chinese public human resource management especially at local levels. It reveals that a bureaucratic culture of patrimonial individualism, including favouritism, nepotism, localism, and factionalism prevailing within Chinese officialdom as the ethos, value, psychological disposition, and behavioural orientation of civil servants, has undermined the development in China of a modern meritocracy-based civil service system. With 14 case studies, this research demonstrates that the Chinese civil service institutions, derived from an opposite culture of hierarchical collectivism, failed to address the cultural constraints over the implementation of the meritocracy principle. The conceptual framework, as well as the case findings, points to legislative and policy reforms in China that would address the problems derived from the unique Chinese bureaucratic culture through further institutional design and capacity building.

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Section: Case Findings and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crowding Out Meritocracy? – Cultural Constraints in Chinese Public Human Resource Management

Zhang

2015

Aust J Public Adm

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“…): As previously mentioned, these hypotheses are structured around existing assumptions and elements which are sometimes considered "common characteristics" in the field of Chinese Elite politics (e.g. Provincial experience [Bo 2007;Kou 2010;Lam 2007; age [Kou and Tsai 2014;Shirk 2015;Zheng 2003], specific types of experiences [Chen, Chen and Chen 2012;Choi 2012;Kou 2010;Kou and Zang 2014;Walder and Li 2001;Zang 2004;2005;, educational background [Li and White 1988;Li and white 1990;], etc.). These limited examples do not take into account more general studies which cross-reference several variables (e.g.…”

Section: What Distinguishes Soon-to-be Promoted Individuals From Theimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Kou and Tsai (2014) or even Zeng (2013) explained, it is all about managing time (i.e. how to save time) in order to remain promotable as long as possible during the "stepby-step" promotion process.…”

Section: Sub Provincial Positions (3 or 4)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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What went wrong?: The case of the non-selected alternate members of the Central Committee from 1992 to 2007

Payette¹

2016

J. Contemp. East. Asia

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“…(Manion 1985: 232) The strict ranking and step-by-step promotion system made it very difficult for young officials to reach high-level positions. In order to solve this issue and promote elite renewal, channels for rapid promotion were formalised (Kou and Tsai 2014). The changes led to a dualtrack promotion system, with some individuals being selected for leading positions early on and promoted quickly through a variety of institutional fast-track channels, while the majority would continue to follow the slower progressive promotion process (Pang, Keng, and Zhong 2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Clientelism by Design: Personnel Politics under Xi Jinping

Doyon¹

2018

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

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Since Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, analysts have puzzled over how best to define his political trajectory. Is he consolidating power and building a personality cult around himself, or is he strengthening the Party as an organisation? I tackle this issue by focusing on the transformation of personnel policies under Xi. I highlight an increasing concentration of power in the hands of Party leaders at all echelons. At the institutional level, the Party increasingly controls the management and disciplining of officials. At the level of the individual cadres themselves, promotion processes are increasingly managed behind closed doors and less importance is being given to objective criteria for cadre advancement. The age-based rules which structured the promotion of officials and ensured a high level of personnel turnover within the party state are also de-emphasised. I argue that these changes are paving the way for a more clientelist and aging party state.

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“Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System

Cited by 113 publications

References 8 publications

Crowding Out Meritocracy? – Cultural Constraints in Chinese Public Human Resource Management

Crowding Out Meritocracy? – Cultural Constraints in Chinese Public Human Resource Management

What went wrong?: The case of the non-selected alternate members of the Central Committee from 1992 to 2007

Clientelism by Design: Personnel Politics under Xi Jinping

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