Spontaneous transfer of matching by infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Oden, David L.; Thompson, Roger K. R.; Premack, David

doi:10.1037/0097-7403.14.2.140

Cited by 135 publications

(127 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Premack (1983b) reported that conceptual-relational matching was expressed by only those of his chimpanzees who had a history of 'language training'. This observation was further confirmed by the finding that infant chimpanzees without prior experience with a token based symbol system failed to match conceptually despite their success on a generalized matching task based on physical resemblance between objects (Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1988;1990). As noted previously, these animals spontaneously transferred their matching ability to novel objects after initial training with only two objects, a lock and a cup.…”

Section: Profound Disparities In Conceptual Relational Abilitiessupporting

confidence: 65%

“…Good evidence of a broadly construed reflexive concept of physical identity was revealed in infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) by Oden, Thompson, & Premack (1988) using a matching task (cf., Nissen, Blum, & Blum, 1948). Visual (and auditory) generalized matching is facilitated in both old-and new-world monkeys when a large stimulus pool of objects is used as opposed to a limited sample set (cf., D'Amato, Salmon, & Columbo, 1985;Wright, Shyan, & Jitsumori, 1990).…”

Section: What Constitutes Evidence Of An Identity Concept?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ideally, a comprehensive study of concepts in nonhuman primates should permit one to separate out the effects of the implicit and explicit components on conceptually mediated performances. We have encouraged, therefore, conjoining the use of instrumental tasks with the methodologies used to investigate perceptual capacities in preverbal human infants (Oden et al, 1988;Thompson & Oden, 1996).…”

Section: Why Might An Animal Fail An Instrumental Conceptual Task?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Noninstrumental perceptual tasks which are becoming increasingly used with nonhuman primates, both in the field and laboratory, use preferential gaze or object manipulation as the dependent measure in familiarization/novelty or violation of expectation tasks as well as habituation/dishabituation procedures (e.g., Hauser, MacNeilage, & Ware, 1996;Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1988;Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990;Thompson & Oden, 1996;Gunderson & Swartz, 1986).…”

Section: Measuring Perceptual Sensitivity To Abstract Relational mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: the paleological monkey and the analogical ape

Thompson¹

2000

Cognitive Science

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Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the substantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abilities range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes, associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in analogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of results from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, but not apes, might be best regarded as "paleo-logicans" in the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evidence that monkeys can perceive, let alone judge, relations-between-relations. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and humans. Interestingly, the "analogical ape," like the child, can make its analogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system by which propositional representations can be encoded and manipulated

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Section: Profound Disparities In Conceptual Relational Abilitiessupporting

confidence: 65%

Section: What Constitutes Evidence Of An Identity Concept?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Why Might An Animal Fail An Instrumental Conceptual Task?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Measuring Perceptual Sensitivity To Abstract Relational mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: the paleological monkey and the analogical ape

Thompson¹

2000

Cognitive Science

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“…Acquisition of an identity concept in matchingto-sample can be inferred from successful transfer to novel sample stimuli following acquisition with only two stimuli serving alternatively as the sample and nonmatching choice during training (Oden et al, 1988). If novel stimuli only are used on each trial during training, then the transfer of matching may in fact be mediated on the basis of either absolute or relative familiarity and novelty, rather than on the basis of reflexive identity.…”

Section: Categorisation Of Abstract Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Categories as paradigms for comparative cognition

Zayan¹,

Vauclair

1998

Behavioural Processes

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Forming categories is a basic cognitive operation allowing animals to attain concepts, i.e. to represent various classes of objects, natural or artificial, physical or social. Categories can also be formed about the relations holding among these objects, notably similarity and identity. Some of the cognitive processes involved in categorisation will be enumerated. Also, special reference will be made to a much neglected area of research, that of social representations. Here, animals conceive the natural class of their conspecifics as well as the relationships established between them in groups. Two types of social categories were mentioned: (1) intraspecies recognition including recognition of individual conspecifics; and (2) representation of dominance hierarchies and of their transitivity in linear orders.

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Concept learning set-size functions for Clark's nutcrackers

Wright¹,

Magnotti²,

Katz

et al. 2015

Jrnl Exper Analysis Behavior

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Same/Different abstract-concept learning by Clark's nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) was tested with novel stimuli following learning of training set expansion (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, and 1024 picture items). The resulting set-size function was compared to those from rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), and pigeons (Columba livia). Nutcrackers showed partial concept learning following initial eight-item set learning, unlike the other species (Magnotti, Katz, Wright, & Kelly, 2015). The mean function for the nutcrackers' novel-stimulus transfer increased linearly as a function of the logarithm of training set size, which intersected its baseline function at the 128-item set size. Thus, nutcrackers on average achieved full concept learning (i.e., transfer statistically equivalent to baseline performance) somewhere between set sizes of 64 to 128 items, similar to full concept learning by monkeys. Pigeons required a somewhat larger training set (256 items) for full concept learning, but results from other experiments (initial training and transfer with 32- and 64-item set sizes) suggested carryover effects with smaller set sizes may have artificially prolonged the pigeon's full concept learning. We find it remarkable that these diverse species with very different neural architectures can fully learn this same/different abstract concept, and (at least under some conditions) do so with roughly similar sets sizes (64-128 items) and numbers of training exemplars, despite initial concept learning advantages (nutcrackers), learning disadvantages (pigeons), or increasing baselines (monkeys).

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Spontaneous transfer of matching by infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Cited by 135 publications

References 47 publications

Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: the paleological monkey and the analogical ape

Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: the paleological monkey and the analogical ape

Categories as paradigms for comparative cognition

Concept learning set-size functions for Clark's nutcrackers

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