Splitting the Difference? The Politics of District Creation in Indonesia

Pierskalla, Jan H.

doi:10.5129/001041516817037754

Cited by 47 publications

(41 citation statements)

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“…This does not systematically seem to be the case. For one, the results are robust to including lagged levels of violence as a control (see Section 19 in the Appendix) and violence in itself is not predictive of district splits (Pierskalla 2016). Overall, the effects of district creation are more in line with Hypothesis 2a.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 77%

“…7 Approximately 60 percent of local government spending on average is allocated to service delivery in these three sectors (Lewis 2013). (Cohen 2003, Ford 2003, Fitrani, Hofman and Kaiser 2005, Nordholt and van Klinken 2007, Kimura 2013, Pierskalla 2016. The proliferation of territorial administrative units is not a necessary feature of decentralization reforms as it also occurs in centralized regimes.…”

Section: The Indonesian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Unpacking the Effect of Decentralized Governance on Routine Violence: Lessons from Indonesia

Pierskalla

Sacks

2017

World Development

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 77%

Section: The Indonesian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unpacking the Effect of Decentralized Governance on Routine Violence: Lessons from Indonesia

Pierskalla

Sacks

2017

World Development

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“…In contrast, as discussed above, the most prominent quantitative studies of administrative unit splitting rely, instead, on data at the level of the locality that splits (Green 2010;Kasara 2006;Pierskalla 2013;Malesky 2009). Using subdistrict data allows us to reveal intradistrict dynamics.…”

Section: Unit Of Analysis and Data Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 90%

Administrative Unit Proliferation

2014

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N umerous developing countries have substantially increased their number of subnational administrative units in recent years. The literature on this phenomenon is, nonetheless, small and suffers from several theoretical and methodological shortcomings: in particular, a unit of analysis problem that causes past studies to mistakenly de-emphasize the importance of local actors. We posit that administrative unit proliferation occurs where and when there is a confluence of interests between the national executive and local citizens and elites from areas that are politically, economically, and ethnically marginalized. We argue further that although the proliferation of administrative units often accompanies or follows far-reaching decentralization reforms, it likely results in a recentralization of power; the proliferation of new local governments fragments existing units into smaller ones with lower relative intergovernmental bargaining power and administrative capacity. We find support for these arguments using original data from Uganda.

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“…While there were 292 districts in 1999, the number of districts increased to 497 in 2012 14 . As demonstrated by Pierskalla (2014), district splitting was endogenous to ethnic heterogeneity. Second, the Population Census is conducted only once a decade, so our measures of ethnic heterogeneity are time-invariant during the entire decade following the 2000 Census.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 90%

Ethnic Segregation and Public Goods: Evidence from Indonesia

2018

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This article contributes to the study of ethnic diversity and public goods provision by assessing the role of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. Through a new theory that we callspatial interdependence, we argue that the segregation of ethnic groups can reduce or even neutralize the “diversity penalty” in public goods provision that results from ethnic fractionalization. This is because local segregation allows communities to use disparities in the level of public goods compared with other communities as leverage when advocating for more public goods for themselves, thereby ratcheting up the level of public goods across communities. We test this prediction on highly disaggregated data from Indonesia and find strong support that, controlling for ethnic fractionalization, segregated communities have higher levels of public goods. This has an important and underexplored implication: decentralization disadvantages integrated communities vis-à-vis their more segregated counterparts.

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Splitting the Difference? The Politics of District Creation in Indonesia

Cited by 47 publications

References 0 publications

Unpacking the Effect of Decentralized Governance on Routine Violence: Lessons from Indonesia

Unpacking the Effect of Decentralized Governance on Routine Violence: Lessons from Indonesia

Administrative Unit Proliferation

Ethnic Segregation and Public Goods: Evidence from Indonesia

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