Spinoza and the Logical Limits of Mental Representation

Abstract

This paper examines Spinoza's view on the consistency of mental representation. First, I argue that he departs from Scholastic tradition by arguing that all mental states-whether desires, intentions, beliefs, perceptions, entertainings, etc.-must be logically consistent. Second, I argue that his endorsement of this view is motivated by key Spinozistic doctrines, most importantly the doctrine that all acts of thought represent what could follow from God's nature. Finally, I argue that Spinoza's view that all mental representation is consistent pushes him to a linguistic account of contradiction.

Spinoza on Counterpossible Inferences

“…He includes among the Platonizing interpretations those by Martin (2008), Garrett (2009), Ward (2011), Schmaltz (2015), Viljanen (2011), andScribano (2008). 16 For a full defense of this claim, refer to Barry (2019). Much of this section draws from that article.…”

“…The technical use of ‘chimera’ to mean a self‐contradictory being seems to come from Buridan's Sophisms on Meaning and Truth . Refer to Barry (2019) for an in‐depth discussion of chimaeras in Spinoza.…”

“…16 16 For a full defense of this claim, refer to Barry (2019). Much of this section draws from that article.…”