Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom

Barry, Galen

doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1129632

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2021

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“…23 9 Descartes had asserted at Principles I.41 that we have an indubitable first-person awareness of our freedom of indifference (1982,19). On such arguments from the first-person experience of freedom and Spinoza's influential criticisms, see Barry (2016). And see Lascano (2021) on Du Châtelet's response to worries that our experience of freedom is illusory.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Du Châtelet's Libertarianism

Wells

2021

History of Philosophy Quarterly

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There is a growing consensus that Emilie Du Châtelet's challenging essay “On Freedom” defends compatibilism. I offer an alternative, libertarian reading of the essay I lay out the prima facie textual evidence for such a reading. I also explain how apparently compatibilist remarks in “On Freedom” can be read as aspects of a sophisticated type of libertarianism that rejects blind or arbitrary choice. To this end, I consider the historical context of Du Châtelet's essay, and especially the dialectic between various strands of eighteenth-century libertarianism and compatibilism.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%