2018
DOI: 10.1177/1077800418786312
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Spinoza and the Affective Turn: A Return to the Philosophical Origins of Affect

Abstract: In their introduction to a recent special issue of Qualitative Inquiry, Taguchi and St. Pierre observed that Foucault’s notion of “fruitful disorientation” seemed to circulate throughout the included articles. Embracing this fruitfully disorienting impulse, the authors of this article provide a detailed reading of Baruch Spinoza’s ontological concept of affect as he articulated it in the Ethics. Through this return, the authors consider the implications of affect for qualitative and postqualitative inquiry and… Show more

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Cited by 28 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Analysis is concerned with the relational and affective capacities of these assemblages as they emerge through people’s exercise practices performed in the home and surrounding spaces. Affect here is taken from Spinozian (Robinson and Kutner, 2019) and Deleuze (1992) thinking to refer to the generative forces or intensities produced when bodies encounter one another. While these intensities are often felt as corporeal, the body here is not limited to the human fleshly body but is extended out into more-than-human entities and gatherings (Barad, 2007; Braidotti, 2019).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Analysis is concerned with the relational and affective capacities of these assemblages as they emerge through people’s exercise practices performed in the home and surrounding spaces. Affect here is taken from Spinozian (Robinson and Kutner, 2019) and Deleuze (1992) thinking to refer to the generative forces or intensities produced when bodies encounter one another. While these intensities are often felt as corporeal, the body here is not limited to the human fleshly body but is extended out into more-than-human entities and gatherings (Barad, 2007; Braidotti, 2019).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Critical/vital/feminist new materialist and new empiricist literature (Bennett 2010; Braidotti 2019; Clough 2009; Stewart 2007) helped me understand how my felt sense of creative flow pointed to subtle affective constellations beyond my self—to the immanent potential of digital materials. My felt senses related to “an ability to affect and be affected,” Brian Massumi’s (1987, xvi) deceptively simple definition of affect , traced to Spinoza through Deleuze (Robinson & Kutner 2019) and so commonly used it often goes unquoted (e.g., Bozalek et al 2021, 850; Gale & Wyatt 2019, 566; Gershon 2013, 258). My experiences resonated with scholars who, drawing on this philosophical lineage, describe affect as a “preconscious … pre‐individual” force, “a capacity for activation” (Clough 2009, 48) not confined to human actors or intentions.…”
Section: Feeling Virtual Affect and Immanencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet affect may also emerge as horror and fear. As Robinson and Kutner (2019) argue, there is a tendency in the literature to posit affect as always joyful and affirmative, but this is not always so. There was a living sense of European history in this university: 'In Europe we know what happens when you lose humanism.…”
Section: Holding On To Humanism In the University: Implications For Human Rightsmentioning
confidence: 99%