Spectrum leasing via selective cooperation in distributed cognitive radio networks

Reversed Stackelberg bandwidth-sharing game for cognitive multi-hop cellular networks

“…During the step-by-step iteration, this feedback process is repeated until the best solution has been found. When either the leader or followers, given the strategy of the other, can not obtain any utility increase by deviating from its own strategy, the network reaches an effective solution [15,16]; it can be written as (S * L , S * F(1) , S * F(2) . .…”

“…The outcome of the RSs' decisions is the input back to the BS, and the BS adjusts a values to determine the next round of leased bandwidth amount. By using this dynamic iterative feedback loop, the BS and the RSs can be interacting with one another and make their decisions in a way to obtain an effective network performance [15,16].…”

“…Using a simulation model, the performance of the proposed scheme is compared with the three existing bandwidth-sharing schemes: the RSCST scheme [5], the DSLSS scheme [14] and the DSLSC scheme [15]. The assumptions implemented in our simulation model were as follows: † The arrival process for new call requests is Poisson with rate l (calls/s).…”

“…Section 2 describes the proposed bandwidth-sharing scheme in detail. In Section 3, performance evaluation results are presented along with comparisons with the schemes proposed in [5,14,15]. Finally, the concluding remarks are given in Section 4.…”

“…The RSCST scheme also developed a supervising-cooperating mechanism to adjust its strategies interactively. The distributed spectrum leasing via selective cooperation (DSLSC) scheme in [15] was developed as a game model for spectrum leasing in CR networks. The DSLSC scheme described the dynamic interaction between the primary and secondary users based on a noncooperative game model.…”