Spectrum governance regimes: efficiency properties and policy choices

Abstract

Purpose -This paper proposes to describe a model and the results of a simulation exercise used to compare welfare outcomes for four governance regimes that might be employed for wireless services: two spectrum ownership regimes and two open commons regimes. Aims also to examine practical implications for policy makers.Design/methodology/approach -A formal economic model was constructed and computational techniques were employed to explore the welfare consequences of alternative applications of policy instruments.Findings -For the model examined, the market does as well as can be expected from government in setting interference tolerance for both types of regimes. However, commons regimes always generate excessive entry. While the theoretical optimum achievable by government in an ownership regime exceeds predicted welfare for a commons regime, for most model specifications the difference is not too large and an ownership regime can easily under-perform a commons regime if imperfectly-informed policy makers set policy variables incorrectly.Research limitations/implications -The necessity of using computational methods limits the generality of the findings.Practical implications -The modeling approach and analysis identify critical tradeoffs that must be addressed by policy makers in designing spectrum governance institutions.Originality/value -This analytical approach makes possible hitherto impossible, side-by-side performance comparisons for alternative governance regimes. The framework can be extended and generalized to other policy issues.

Fortress Europe 4.0? An analysis of EU data governance through the lens of the resource regime concept

“…The resource regime concept can similarly account for different forms of governance constituted by the interplay of various elements. For instance, studies on the management of radio spectrums, which form a limited resource, have examined how technological standards together with allocation rules and usage rights combine into different regimes that structure competition (e.g., Wildman et al, 2006).…”

Efficient Allocation of Radio Spectrum

“…Getting the parameters wrong consistently yields lower simulated social welfare outcomes for the property right regime. Wildman, Bauer, and Ting () confirm the results in an expanded version of the original model.…”

Wireless Regulations and Dynamic Spectrum Access in Australia

“…Table I below illustrates the typical features of each licensing regime as a set of specific coordinates in a multidimensional space 7 . (T,S) stands for Technology and Service neutrality ; P stands for Price.…”

“…6 The Spectrum Management Authority (SMA) was merged with the Australian Telecommunications Authority (AUSTEL) on 1 July 1997 to form the Australian Communications Authority (ACA), later to become the ACMA after merging with the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) in 2005. 7 Note that some apparatus and class licences will not correspond to this depiction, which, instead, attempts to describe representative licences.…”

“…Beyond the ideological nature of the debate, these regulatory approaches are also part of a wider dilemma over how to appropriate and distribute the rents generated by exclusive or semi-exclusive wireless access rights [6,7,5,8]. The property rights regime has been particularly polemical among academic and policy researchers 2 .…”