Spectrum Coordination in Energy-Efficient Cognitive Radio Networks

Abstract

Device coordination in open spectrum systems is a challenging problem, particularly since users experience varying spectrum availability over time and location. In this paper, we propose a game theoretical approach that allows cognitive radio pairs, namely the primary user (PU) and the secondary user (SU), to update their transmission powers and frequencies simultaneously. Specifically, we address a Stackelberg game model in which individual users attempt to hierarchically access to the wireless spectrum while maximizing their energy efficiency. A thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium is conducted. In particular, we show that a spectrum coordination naturally occurs when both actors in the system decide sequentially about their powers and their transmitting carriers. As a result, spectrum sensing in such a situation turns out to be a simple detection of the presence/absence of a transmission on each sub-band. We also show that when users experience very different channel gains on their two carriers, they may choose to transmit on the same carrier at the Stackelberg equilibrium as this contributes enough energy efficiency to outweigh the interference degradation caused by the mutual transmission. Then, we provide an algorithmic analysis on how the PU and the SU can reach such a spectrum coordination using an appropriate learning process. We validate our results through extensive simulations and compare the proposed algorithm to some typical scenarios including the noncooperative case in [1] and the throughput-based-utility systems. Typically, it is shown that the proposed Stackelberg decision approach optimizes the energy efficiency while still maximizing the throughput at the equilibrium.

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“…The second term in (43) can be bounded by using the same technique in [20] (page [26][27][28]. Let us substitute inequality (32) into (44), and then substitute (44) into equation (43) and sum over n. Use the fact that the sum of expectation on u and q t with respect toΦ t (j) is less than E It∼p tΦ t (j). Take expectation over all random strategies of losses up to time n, we obtain…”

On the Two-User Multi-Carrier Joint Channel Selection and Power Control Game

“…In a prior work [21], we proposed a hierarchical game theoretic model for two-user-two-carrier energy efficient wireless systems. It was shown that, for the vast majority of cases, users choose their transmitting carriers in such a way that if the leader transmits on a given carrier, the follower has incentive to choose the other carrier.…”

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