Spectrum combinatorial double auction for cognitive radio network with ubiquitous network resource providers

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

Self Cite

In a mobile blockchain network, many mobile devices have insufficient computational capacity to execute computation-intensive tasks locally. To tackle this problem, blockchain tasks can be offloaded to edge servers with the aid of auction. However, most auction mechanisms on mobile blockchain ignore the automatic parallel execution and long-term performance. This paper aims to solve the problem of computation offloading in a mobile blockchain network. We transform this problem into a multi-choice multi-dimensional knapsack problem which is NP-hard. To improve the total utility of auction participants, this paper proposes a smart-contract-based double auction mechanism, named long-term auction for mobile blockchain (LAMB). The subtasks can be offloaded from one mobile device to heterogeneous edge servers. Also, LAMB satisfies the economic properties of an auction mechanism. Experimental results demonstrate that, the utility and utilization ratio can be achieved by 130.55% higher and 138.64% higher, respectively, in comparison to the existing auction algorithm WBD. Furthermore, the proposed LAMB can guarantee long-term performance for task offloading, and it can achieve automatic execution in an autonomous and secure environment.

Section: Economic Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Assume that 900 mining tasks are offloaded to 5 edge servers [47]. For the computational resources that consist of CPU memory, battery, etc, their amount is generated randomly between 0 and 5, and the value of their bids is generated randomly between 1 and 5.5.…”

Section: Evaluation a Simulation Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Contract-Based Long-Term Auction for Mobile Blockchain Computation Offloading

Liu

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

Self Cite

“…Although there were multiple source-destination pairs sharing one particular relay in [25], it is not suitable for multiple relays' scenario. Other auction schemes for spectrum sharing can refer to [26]. Most of those studies do not consider relay competitions.…”

Section: B Incentive-based Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…where the term g∈G π g i n g can be determined by (26), which is the equilibrium of the evolutionary game for the OMDs. Substituting (26) into (29), we have…”

Section: ) Evolution Dynamics Of Omdsmentioning

confidence: 99%

BRAINS: Joint Bandwidth-Relay Allocation in Multihoming Cooperative D2D Networks

IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.

Dai

et al. 2018

Self Cite

As an emerging technique, cooperative device to device (CD2D) communication has been considered to be a solution to capacity shortage problem. Combining multi-homing and CD2D techniques together can potentially improve network performance. We propose a novel multi-homing CD2D (MH-CD2D) network, in which multiple homing mobile devices (MMDs) act as relays for the cooperative communications of ordinary mobile devices (OMDs). We formulate such joint bandwidth-relay allocation problem as a two-stage game, in order to deal with two challenges: 1) how to design incentive mechanisms motivating MMDs to lease spare bandwidths to OMDs; 2) how to help OMDs to choose appropriate MMD relays. In the first stage, we use a non-cooperative game to model the competition between MMDs in terms of shared bandwidth and price. In the second stage, we model the behavior of OMDs selecting MMDs by an evolutionary game.We prove that there exists Nash equilibrium in the game and propose a distributed incentive scheme named IMES to solve the joint bandwidth-relay allocation problem. Extensive simulation results show that the equilibrium can be achieved and the best response price of one MMD increases with the other's best price in the Stackelberg game. The utility of MMDs increases with the number of OMDs in each OMD group at the evolutionary equilibrium. The proposed algorithms are able to reduce average service delay by more than 25% in comparison to the randomized scheme which is frequently used in the most existing works. On average, IMES outperforms existing scheme by about 20.37% in terms of utility of MMDs.

“…L .Chen et.al. [6] proposed a novelty CDA mechanism for spectrum allocation in cognitive radio network, G .Baranwal et.al. [7] also announced a fair CDA model for resource allocation in cloud computing.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

COUSTIC: Combinatorial Double Auction for Crowd Sensing Task Assignment in Device-to-Device Clouds

Zhai

Huang

Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing

et al. 2018

Self Cite

With the emerging technologies of Internet of Things (IOTs), the capabilities of mobile devices have increased tremendously. However, in the big data era, to complete tasks on one device is still challenging. As an emerging technology, crowdsourcing utilizing crowds of devices to facilitate large scale sensing tasks has gaining more and more research attention. Most of existing works either assume devices are willing to cooperate utilizing centralized mechanisms or design incentive algorithms using double auctions. Which is not practical to deal with the case when there is a lack of centralized controller for the former, and not suitable to the case when the seller device is also resource constrained for the later. In this paper, we propose a truthful incentive mechanism with combinatorial double auction for crowd sensing task assignment in device-to-device (D2D) clouds, where a single mobile device with intensive sensing task can hire a group of idle neighboring devices. With this new mechanism, time critical sensing tasks can be handled in time with a distributed nature. We prove that the proposed mechanism is truthful, individual rational, budget balance and computational efficient. Our simulation results demonstrate that combinatorial double auction mechanism gets a 26.3% and 15.8% gains in comparison to existing double auction scheme and the centralized maximum matching based algorithm respectively.