Specifying the role of function in infant categorization

Abstract

Research demonstrates that object functions facilitate artifact categorization in infancy. To explicate the nature and magnitude of this effect, 16-month-olds participated in three studies. In Experiment 1, categorization was facilitated more by object functions than by distinctive motions, suggesting that the motion properties of function cannot fully explain its influence. In Experiment 2, infants failed to categorize when each category exemplar performed a different function, thus revealing the importance of shared functionality in facilitating categorization. In Experiment 3, infants were tested after each new exemplar was introduced. When object functions were provided during training, infants were more likely to appropriately extend the novel categories on the very first trial. This suggests that function reduces the need for exposure to multiple exemplars in forming categories. Together, these findings confirm the conceptual nature of the facilitative effect of function on early categorization. KeywordsCategorization; Function; Comparison; Causal relations; Infancy A wealth of evidence demonstrates that object function exerts a powerful organizing force on early categorization (Booth & Waxman, 2002;Greco, Hayne, & Rovee-Collier, 1990;Horst, Oakes, & Madole, 2005;Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blair, 2000;Nelson & Ware, 2002;Träuble & Pauen, 2007). Not only do object functions directly influence decisions that infants and toddlers make regarding category membership, they also facilitate the formation of new categories, exemplars of which can later be identified on the basis of less transient object properties (like shape or color). For example, Booth and Waxman (2002) demonstrated that 14-and 18-month-old infants extend novel artifact categories on the basis of perceptual similarity more readily when provided with information about object function than when exposed to other perceptual object properties alone.Infants in Booth and Waxman (2002) first observed an experimenter manipulate four examples of a novel artifact category. For some infants, the experimenter demonstrated how each object functioned on a uniquely designed apparatus while directing the infant to `look what I can do with this one.' For other infants, the experimenter simply picked up each object while directing the infant to `look at this one.' The experimenter then held up a contrast object drawn from a perceptually different category and highlighted that it did not © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved Requests for reprints should be sent to Amy Booth, Roxelyn and Richard Pepper Department of Communication Sciences and Disorders, Northwestern University, Frances Searle Building, 2240 North Campus Drive, Evanston, IL, 60028. abooth@northwestern.edu.. Publisher's Disclaimer: This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting...

The development of categorisation and conceptual thinking in early childhood: methods and limitations

“…1). Finally, some authors propose that, from 4 months, knowledge about object functions facilitates the categorical representation of artefacts (Stavans & Baillargeon, 2018 ; see Futó et al, 2010 ; Horst et al, 2005 with 10-month-olds; Booth & Waxman, 2002 ; Booth et al, 2010 with 14-month-old children). This evidence supports the possibility that first concepts are not motivated solely by perceptual similarities.…”

“…4 Sample/subsample sizes. Densities and means for each distribution 1987), (ii) whether concepts are based on perceptual (e.g., Fagan, 1976;Welder & Graham, 2006) or functional object attributes (e.g., Booth et al, 2010;Nelson, 1973), (iii) whether basic-level (e.g., Mervis & Crisafi, 1982) or global-level categories (e.g., Mandler & McDonough, 1993;Rostad et al, 2012;Quinn, 2004) are developed first, (iv) whether the structure of concepts resembles that of a complex scientific theory (e.g., Gopnik, 1984) or is formed by everyday particular encounter with objects (e.g., Tomasello, 1999), (v) whether conceptual knowledge is organised in partonomies rather than taxonomies (e.g., Tversky & Hemenway, 1984) and (vi) whether language is essential to concept formation (e.g., Ferry et al, 2010;Xu, 1998) 3 . This links to the debate on the value of empirical indicators considered in each methodological perspective.…”

“…It should be noted that the disparateness of concepts under research is due, at least in part, to differences between the theories that underlie empirical undertakings and between the hypotheses that these theories seek to validate. Thus, some of the theoretical debates concern, for instance, whether in early development (i) concepts are prototypical representations (e.g., Rosch, 1998 ) or represent sets of exemplars (e.g., Hayne et al, 1987 ), (ii) whether concepts are based on perceptual (e.g., Fagan, 1976 ; Welder & Graham, 2006 ) or functional object attributes (e.g., Booth et al, 2010 ; Nelson, 1973 ), (iii) whether basic-level (e.g., Mervis & Crisafi, 1982 ) or global-level categories (e.g., Mandler & McDonough, 1993 ; Rostad et al, 2012 ; Quinn, 2004 ) are developed first, (iv) whether the structure of concepts resembles that of a complex scientific theory (e.g., Gopnik, 1984 ) or is formed by everyday particular encounter with objects (e.g., Tomasello, 1999 ), (v) whether conceptual knowledge is organised in partonomies rather than taxonomies (e.g., Tversky & Hemenway, 1984 ) and (vi) whether language is essential to concept formation (e.g., Ferry et al, 2010 ; Xu, 1998 ) 3 .

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Developmental Origins of Biological Explanations: The case of infants’ internal property bias

“…For example, 11-monthold infants are able to categorize different animal figures (e.g., a giraffe and a crocodile) and different furniture figures (e.g., a chair and a bed) as two contrasting and global kinds (Pauen, 2002), even though the degree of similarity between kinds was lower than the degree of similarity within kinds (e.g., Mandler & McDonough 1993;1998). Infants this same age have also been shown to categorize artifacts based on relevant functional information rather than their overall perceptual similarity (Trauble & Pauen, 2007), but only when object and function are causally connected (Booth, 2008;Booth, Schuler, & Zajicek, 2010;Gopnik & Sobel, 2000). In this way, infants, like adults, seem to represent function as a critical property of artifact kinds (Hernik & Csibra, 2009), and use kind membership as a more reliable source of information to categorize animals than perceptual similarity.…”

Four‐month‐old infants individuate and track simple tools following functional demonstrations

“…In each case, the link between the artifact's outward physical structure and function could not easily be deduced, and the finding that infants assigned the lamp and the radio to separate categories (and hence succeeded at the task) only when given ostensive‐communicative signals was most likely due to this causal opacity. As in the work of Futó et al., much of the research on infants’ ability to form function‐based categories has used causally opaque artifacts with infants age 10 months and older (e.g., Baumgartner & Oakes, ; Booth, Schuler, & Zajicek, ; Booth & Waxman, ; Hernik & Csibra, ; Oakes & Madole, ). In this research, pedagogical signals have also been found to bolster infants’ encoding of functional information, by conveying that what may seem an arbitrary association (e.g., pulling a lever and lights flashing) actually represents an enduring causal relation that can be exploited in future actions.…”