Speciesism and the Idea of Equality

Steinbock, Bonnie

doi:10.1017/s0031819100016582

Cited by 59 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…For thinkers of this view (Steinbock 1978), the moral value of humans is so much greater than that of non-human animals that no intervention that threatens the former for the sake of the latter can be justifiable.…”

Section: Reasonable Chance Of Success Last Resort and Proportionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Humane intervention’: the international protection of animal rights

Cochrane

Cooke

2016

Journal of Global Ethics

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Abstract:This paper explores the international implications of liberal theories which extend justice to sentient animals. In particular, it asks whether they imply that coercive military intervention in a state by external agents to prevent, halt or minimise violations of basic animal rights ('humane intervention') can be justified. In so doing, it employs Simon Caney's theory of humanitarian intervention and applies it to non-human animals. It argues that while humane intervention can be justified in principle, using Caney's assumptions, justifying any particular intervention on behalf of animals is much more difficult -and in present circumstances impossible. If these claims are correct, a number of important conclusions follow. First, all states lack legitimacy because of the horrors that they inflict upon animals. As a result of this, all states are thus prima facie liable to intervention by external agents. To remedy this situation, all states have the responsibility to massively transform their relationship with non-human animals, and to build international institutions to oversee the proper protection of their most basic rights.

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Section: Reasonable Chance Of Success Last Resort and Proportionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Humane intervention’: the international protection of animal rights

Cochrane

Cooke

2016

Journal of Global Ethics

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“…Animals and humans that are able to empathize but not reason are moral agents, in this view. 4 Incorporating these worries, the autonomycentered approach that I consider here requires that to be eligible for moral status one must have the potential to reciprocate moral actions, whether through reason or through empathy. Much of the weight of this requirement hangs on the use of "potential," but I will use it to mean temporal potential, where temporal limitations are not seen as disrupting agency if the agent would otherwise act morally.…”

Section: The Autonomy-centered Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See his Treatise of Human Nature. 4 Some examples of humans that satisfy these criteria may include infants, brain-damaged adults, or severely deformed adults. 5 "Intuition is used in many ways, so it is worth describing my own usage: "moral intuition" is considered moral judgment.…”

Section: How Should We Adjudicate Moral Dilemmas?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Immanuel Kant is the most notable: see his Critique of Practical Reason, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, and The Metaphysics of Morals [2, 3].2 See Bonnie Steinbock's "Speciesism and the idea of equality"[4]. Reciprocity here is not to be confused with Kant's reciprocity thesis, as demonstrated by Henry Allison in "Morality and freedom: Kant's reciprocity thesis," where the reciprocity is between the moral law and the ability to reason or act freely.…”

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confidence: 99%

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It Takes Two: Ethical Dualism in the Vegetative State

Suchy-Dicey

2009

Neuroethics

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“…For example, human beings are normally held to be responsible for what they do.…Secondly, human beings can be expected to reciprocate in a way that non-human animals cannot…Thirdly,…there is the 'desire for self-respect'. 5 Similarly, Mary Anne Warren argues that ''the rights of persons are generally stronger than those of sentient beings which are not persons''. Her main premise to support this conclusion is the following:…”

Section: Humans' Versus Animals' Ethical Status-the Rationality Gambitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases

Norcross

2004

Philosophical Perspectives

161

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Fred's BasementConsider the story of Fred, who receives a visit from the police one day. They have been summoned by Fred's neighbors, who have been disturbed by strange sounds emanating from Fred's basement. When they enter the basement they are confronted by the following scene: Twenty-six small wire cages, each containing a puppy, some whining, some whimpering, some howling. The puppies range in age from newborn to about six months. Many of them show signs of mutilation. Urine and feces cover the bottoms of the cages and the basement floor. Fred explains that he keeps the puppies for twenty-six weeks, and then butchers them while holding them upside-down. During their lives he performs a series of mutilations on them, such as slicing off their noses and their paws with a hot knife, all without any form of anesthesia. Except for the mutilations, the puppies are never allowed out of the cages, which are barely big enough to hold them at twenty-six weeks. The police are horrified, and promptly charge Fred with animal abuse. As details of the case are publicized, the public is outraged. Newspapers are flooded with letters demanding that Fred be severely punished. There are calls for more severe penalties for animal abuse. Fred is denounced as a vile sadist.Finally, at his trial, Fred explains his behavior, and argues that he is blameless and therefore deserves no punishment. He is, he explains, a great lover of chocolate. A couple of years ago, he was involved in a car accident, which resulted in some head trauma. Upon his release from hospital, having apparently suffered no lasting ill effects, he visited his favorite restaurant and ordered their famous rich dark chocolate mousse. Imagine his dismay when he discovered that his experience of the mousse was a pale shadow of its former self. The mousse tasted bland, slightly pleasant, but with none of the intense chocolaty flavor he remembered so well. The waiter assured him that the recipe was unchanged from the last time he had tasted it, just the day before his

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Speciesism and the Idea of Equality

Cited by 59 publications

References 2 publications

‘Humane intervention’: the international protection of animal rights

‘Humane intervention’: the international protection of animal rights

It Takes Two: Ethical Dualism in the Vegetative State

Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases

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