Specialized Courts of Appeals' Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the Politics of Protectionism

Unah, Isaac

doi:10.2307/448990

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“… 4 To a lesser extent, studies have also confirmed that ideology is a major factor in decisionmaking in economic cases (Rohde & Spaeth 1976; Sunstein et al 2004; Lindquist & Spill Solberg 2007; Unah 1997; Ducat & Dudley 1987; Dudley & Ducat 1986). …”

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confidence: 99%

Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Miller¹,

Curry

2009

Law Soc Rev

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What roles do prior expertise and accumulated experience play in shaping ideologically consistent voting on a specialized court? Using a dataset of obviousness patent cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit spanning 1997–2007, we show that prior expertise enhances the influence of ideology on judicial decisionmaking, but that accumulated experience does not. In addition, we build on previous work and show that ideology is a factor in decisionmaking in technical areas of law, contrary to the received wisdom on patent cases.

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confidence: 99%

Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Miller¹,

Curry

2009

Law Soc Rev

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“…; Jackson ; Kennedy ; Boltuck and Litan ; Finger ; Lawrence ; Hansen and Prusa ). Finally, the Customs Court Act of 1980 created a special US Court of International Trade that specifically provides standing for foreign companies and other domestic industries to challenge ITC decisions and even allows the Court to hold hearings in foreign countries to ensure that foreign companies have the opportunity to respond (Hansen, Johnson, and Unah ; Unah ). So, while many elements of the AD/CVD laws provide an advantage to the petitioner, the overall structure appears insufficient to lock in a protectionist bias without additional oversight.…”

Section: Re‐examining Theories Of Itc Oversightmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domestic Competition over Trade Barriers in the US International Trade Commission

Caddel

2013

Int Stud Q

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As governments lower traditional tariffs, they may use non‐tariff barriers, such as antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws, to protect domestic industries. Research on the US International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent agency responsible for adjudicating AD/CVD claims, finds mixed evidence of political influence in these cases. However, this research focuses predominately on the political influence of the petitioning industry. Applying theories of bureaucratic oversight, I posit that the ITC must be receptive both to petitioners and to firms that oppose trade barriers. Using an original data set compiled from ITC records of witness testimony in these cases, I demonstrate that domestic opposition to an AD/CVD petition has a significant effect on ITC decisions. Moreover, members of Congress actively intervene on both sides of AD/CVD petitions and have some influence on ITC decisions. These results suggest that AD/CVD politics in the United States is better understood as a contest between competing domestic interests than a captured bureaucracy providing rents to protectionist interests.

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“…The empirical work of Sheehan (1992) and Unah (1997) suggests that the likelihood of judicial deference depends upon whether an agency is independent or part of the executive branch. Unah (1997) finds that independent agencies fare better than do executive agencies in cases reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.…”

Section: E Presidential Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unah (1997) finds that independent agencies fare better than do executive agencies in cases reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This finding is supported by Sheehan's study of Supreme Court review of agency action (1992).…”

Section: E Presidential Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

INDEX TO Law & Policy

Davis¹

2004

Law & Policy

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This study seeks to expand our understanding of judicial deference to administrative agencies within the context of one particularly important legal forumthe U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The DC circuit functions as a key venue for administrative law cases and the opinions of the court constitute a growing body of common law in the field of administrative law. We investigate the importance of several agency-centered and judge-centered variables in explaining judicial deference to administrative agencies in cases before the DC circuit court during a twelve-year period (1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996). We find that an integrated model of judicial deference, combining both legal and attitudinal factors, best explains judicial deference. Like judges on so many other courts, judges on the DC circuit are politically motivated, but their political activism is tempered by agency-centered factors such as the type of case before the court, and environmental factors such as the composition of the judicial panel reviewing the case and the behavior of the Supreme Court.

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Specialized Courts of Appeals' Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the Politics of Protectionism

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Domestic Competition over Trade Barriers in the US International Trade Commission

INDEX TO Law & Policy

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