Specialized Courts, Bureaucratic Agencies, and the Politics of U.S. Trade Policy

The Influence of Administrative Law Judge and Political Appointee Decisions on Appellate Courts in National Labor Relations Board Cases

“…Future studies should also seek to examine how agency structure and design may impact the level of deference that ALJs, and the agency as a whole, receive in their decision making. Because studies have shown that executive agencies receive less deference than independent agencies (Hansen, Johnson, and Unah ; Sheehan ), it is worth determining whether ALJs in executive agencies would receive less deference than agencies in independent agencies. Additionally, there are procedural differences across agencies that may affect the nature of this relationship.…”

“…Although research does not exist regarding court deference to actors with varying degrees of expertise within the bureaucracy, research does exist that suggests a propensity for courts to defer to higher levels of expertise. Research shows that courts are more likely to defer to independent regulatory agencies than executive agencies as a result of their increased insulation from political influences (Hansen, Johnson, and Unah ; Sheehan ). At an aggregate level, this suggests that courts are more likely to defer to administrative actors when political considerations are minimized and, arguably, as a result, expertise is more highly promoted.…”

“…This consideration is further supported by research that suggests specialized courts, which can develop expertise in specific areas of law, are less likely to defer to administrative agencies than courts of general jurisdiction (Hansen, Johnson, and Unah 1995). Said differently, as the knowledge gap between the court and the agency closes, thereby increasing judicial capacity, courts feel less need to rely on the expertise of administrative agencies in their decision making.…”

Small‐Group Dynamics, Ideology, and Decision Making on the US Courts of Appeals

“…In order to establish a theoretical foundation for our expectation that specialists will be more ideological in their decision making than their nonspecialist counterparts and to highlight potential mechanisms by which specialists may influence their nonspecialist colleagues, we turn to the emerging literature on the effects of specialization and expertise in judicial decision making. Although ideology's influence on judicial decision making is well established in many contexts (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek ; Segal and Spaeth ; Goldman ; Goldman ), relatively few studies have investigated its relationship to judicial choice in conjunction with specialization in particular subject matters (Miller and Curry ; Unah ; Hansen, Johnson, and Unah ; see Baum ). To the extent that such forays have been made, they have centered on the idea that specialization may be especially relevant to ideology's influence within difficult or technical areas of law.…”

Domestic Competition over Trade Barriers in the US International Trade Commission

“…In addition, AD/CVD law remains extremely vague, referencing "unfair trade practice" and imports less than "fair value," but stopping short of defining those terms with any specificity and leaving wide legal discretion over the standards applied in each case (Finger et al 1982;Jackson 1984;Kennedy 1986;Boltuck and Litan 1991;Finger 1993;Lawrence 1994;Hansen and Prusa 1996). Finally, the Customs Court Act of 1980 created a special US Court of International Trade that specifically provides standing for foreign companies and other domestic industries to challenge ITC decisions and even allows the Court to hold hearings in foreign countries to ensure that foreign companies have the opportunity to respond (Hansen, Johnson, and Unah 1995;Unah 1997). So, while many elements of the AD/ CVD laws provide an advantage to the petitioner, the overall structure appears insufficient to lock in a protectionist bias without additional oversight.…”