Specialist vs. Generalist: Efficiency in Multitasking

Buchen, Clemens; Kragl, Jenny; Palermo, Alberto

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109699

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Similarly, in our model, high-performing family managers can be considered to be specialists regarding the family's non-economic goals. However, different from our work, in Buchen and Kragl (2021), task-specific performance measures are available, thereby ruling out effort distortion and its effects altogether. Kragl and Schöttner (2014) analyze how an imposed minimum wage affects the optimal job design when interrelated tasks can be assigned to one or two homogeneous specialized agents.…”

Section: Contribution To Human-capital Multitasking and Agency Litera...mentioning

confidence: 67%

“…A few further studies have employed multitask models similar to ours for investigating different research questions. Buchen and Kragl (2021) analyze productive efficiency under multitasking more generally by comparing the performance of specialist and generalist agents. Similarly, in our model, high-performing family managers can be considered to be specialists regarding the family's non-economic goals.…”

Section: Contribution To Human-capital Multitasking and Agency Litera...mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Hiring family or non-family managers when non-economic (sustainability) goals matter? A multitask agency model

Kragl

Palermo

et al. 2023

Small Bus Econ

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Nepotism, altruism, lower managerial abilities, and a small pool of qualified family candidates may speak against family management. However, a large share of family-owned firms is run by family managers. Our study develops a theoretical model that provides an explanation for this paradox, linked to the multitasking problem of managing economic and non-economic tasks in family firms. Comparing the performance of family and non-family managers under moral hazard and imperfect performance measurement, we find that incentive pay leads to an effort distortion towards economic outcomes for both manager types, however less so for family managers. This effort distortion is less pronounced when economic and non-economic management tasks are complements. We show that family managers with excellent skills regarding non-economic goals of the owner family often outperform non-family managers even if they have poor skills in economic tasks or, what is more, if they have lower average abilities altogether. We further show that the interdependence between economic and non-economic goals in the manager’s job tends to have a moderating effect on the family manager’s relative performance. Our study contributes to the literature about family management and agency costs in family firms and has practical implications for family firms’ hiring decisions. By highlighting the importance of non-economic goals, it moreover adds to the current discussion about the compliance with firms’ sustainability goals.

show abstract

Section: Contribution To Human-capital Multitasking and Agency Litera...mentioning

confidence: 67%

Section: Contribution To Human-capital Multitasking and Agency Litera...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hiring family or non-family managers when non-economic (sustainability) goals matter? A multitask agency model

Kragl

Palermo

et al. 2023

Small Bus Econ

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The literature studied the interaction between different tasks, as well as how to optimize the assignment of tasks among different professional agents [9,10]. The dynamic model proposed to study how to handle multi-task situations when employees have a certain specialty was also investigated [11,12]. However, the above studies did not consider the case that the incentive object can be difficult to replace among different tasks, and the incentive object itself is relatively homogenous.…”

Section: Theoretical Background 21 Multi-task Principal-agent Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Continuous Motivation of Algorithm Engineers under Multiple Objectives: A Mixed-Methods Study

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is a multi-objective coordination relationship between online platform enterprises and algorithm engineers. Based on principal–agent theory, this study builds a multi-objective coordination incentive model for the two using a mixed-methods approach. Qualitative analysis reveals three main attributes of algorithm items: completion time, difficulty, and quality. The quantitative analysis had two results: first, the level of effort of algorithm engineers on the three indicators—time, difficulty coefficient, and quality—is correlated positively with their own technical competence and negatively with the change rate of their marginal effort costs. Second, the company’s incentive coefficient for algorithm engineers depends on two factors: (1) comprehensive technical level, risk aversion coefficient, and marginal effort cost change rate of each algorithm engineer; and (2) the importance of the project for the company. The research findings suggest that enterprises adopt different incentive methods for different projects and enact hierarchical incentives for algorithm engineers with different levels of technical competence.

show abstract

What is the price of a skill? The value of complementarity

Stephany,

Teutloff

2024

Research Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Specialist vs. Generalist: Efficiency in Multitasking

Cited by 4 publications

References 15 publications

Hiring family or non-family managers when non-economic (sustainability) goals matter? A multitask agency model

Hiring family or non-family managers when non-economic (sustainability) goals matter? A multitask agency model

Exploring the Continuous Motivation of Algorithm Engineers under Multiple Objectives: A Mixed-Methods Study

What is the price of a skill? The value of complementarity

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About