Special Session: Noninvasive Sensor-Spoofing Attacks on Embedded and Cyber-Physical Systems

Abstract

Recent decades have observed the proliferation of sensors in embedded and cyber-physical systems (ECPSs). Sensors are an essential part of embedded and CPSs and serve as a bridge between physical quantities and connected systems. The tight coupling between sensors and systems enables many critical applications where decisions are taken by using the information from various sensors at different time-scales. This tight coupling opens the "Pandora's Box" of unknown threats that could come from very unconventional ways. An unconventional attack model could be to noninvasively attack sensors using forged spoofing signals and trigger unwanted behavior in connected systems. This paper introduces this type of new, strong, and unorthodox attack model and elaborates how important this will be in the near future when sensors will pervade our lives. Moreover, this paper presents a motivational example of a sensor-spoofing attack on Hall sensors in the context of smart grids to demonstrate the harmful consequences of this type of attack in ECPSs.