Speaking Bitterness: History, Media and Nation in Twentieth Century China

Abstract

"Speaking bitterness" is the dominant narrative pattern of modern Chinese history. We argue here that it also structures historical fiction. "Speaking bitterness" transforms local stories of personal suffering into collective narratives of blood and tears. It is a discursive practice that may simultaneously construct Nation and Subject, blending individual stories into collective memory that claims-or counterclaims-to be "truth written in blood". We focus on various "texts": four film versions of the Opium War, the trial of Jiang Qing as part of the Gang of Four, and Hou Hsiao-hsien's film, City of Sadness.

Proposing a new framework

“…Despite the enormity of the tasks he faced, Deng used many strategies to instigate the transitioning process from terror to normalcy (Fairbank et al, 1989: 974–985). Some of the methods employed by Deng between 1976 and 1981 include “a state-run media campaign, a nationwide ‘wound literature,’ a de-Maoification campaign, the trial [of Madame Mao and her associates] as a ‘formal finale,’ and a definitive Party history on the years 1949 to 1981” (Farquhar and Berry, 2003: 130). All of these tactics were aimed at the same goal, viz ., “history-fiction” which amounted to the constructive destruction through narratives and counternarratives of the cultural memory in China (Farquhar and Berry, 2003: 120).…”

“…To this end, the regime engaged in logical and legal tai chi to draw a distinction between the “political” mistakes of Mao Zedong and the allegedly criminal activities of his subordinates (Tung, 1981: 2–3). This was part and parcel of a “revised Party history” in which “the newly constituted Party under Deng Xiaoping … claimed credit for exorcizing the wound, ending class struggle, and reasserting law and order” (Farquhar and Berry, 2003: 128).…”

“…Yet, the revival of free thinking survived the death of the journals. In particular, a national understanding of the Ten Lost Years entitled “‘[s]peaking bitterness’ [has become] the dominant narrative of modern Chinese history” (Farquhar and Berry, 2003: 134). As Mary Farquhar and Chris Berry argue, “twentieth century Chinese historiography” itself became a key force in shaping the national memory “… by seizing the opportunity of the mass media to produce narratives that speak bitterness to encourage a sense of being part of the national ‘people.’” (Farquhar and Berry, 2003: 174).…”

“…In particular, a national understanding of the Ten Lost Years entitled “‘[s]peaking bitterness’ [has become] the dominant narrative of modern Chinese history” (Farquhar and Berry, 2003: 134). As Mary Farquhar and Chris Berry argue, “twentieth century Chinese historiography” itself became a key force in shaping the national memory “… by seizing the opportunity of the mass media to produce narratives that speak bitterness to encourage a sense of being part of the national ‘people.’” (Farquhar and Berry, 2003: 174). Thus, providing “space” whether a physical location or a symbolic one for people to begin coming to terms with the tumultuous past is an important step to recovering a sense of communal well-being (Mertus, 2000: 159; Rigby, 2001: 55 –59; Villa-Vicencio, 2004: 41).…”

“…Lasting for over a month (i.e. November 20 to December 29), their trials received massive attention from the Chinese populace, reaching a domestic audience of approximately 210 million through television broadcasts and appealing to the general populace “through newspapers, posters, official releases, photos, cartoons, [and] documentaries …” (Farquhar and Berry, 2003: 129). The trial thus became the centerpiece of the new regime under Deng Xiaoping, representing both a power struggle between Deng and the “whatever” faction of Maoist loyalists and an “ideological struggle” for the soul of the nation (Hsiung, 1981: 2).…”