SPALAX new generation: New process design for a more efficient xenon production system for the CTBT noble gas network

Topin, Sylvain; Gréau, Claire; Deliere, Ludovic; Hovesepian, Alexandre; Taffary, T.; Petit, G. Le; Douysset, Guilhem; Moulin, Christophe

doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2015.06.027

Cited by 26 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The IMS noble gas stations RN20 and RN45 are equipped with the Spalax system 30 , 31 and measure radioxenon activity concentrations every 24 h, whereas RN38 is equipped with the Sauna system 32 and measures radioxenon activity concentrations every 12 h. Finally, RN58 is equipped with the Arix system and measures radioxenon activity concentrations every 12 h 33 .…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Source localisation and its uncertainty quantification after the third DPRK nuclear test

Meutter

Camps

Delcloo

et al. 2018

Sci Rep

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The International Monitoring System is being set up aiming to detect violations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Suspicious radioxenon detections were made by the International Monitoring System after the third announced nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In this paper, inverse atmospheric transport and dispersion modelling was applied to these detections, to determine the source location, the release term and its associated uncertainties. The DPRK nuclear test site was found to be a likely source location, though a second likely source region in East Asia was found by the inverse modelling, partly due to the radioxenon background from civilian sources. Therefore, techniques to indirectly assess the influence of the radioxenon background are suggested. In case of suspicious radioxenon detections after a man-made explosion, atmospheric transport and dispersion modelling is a powerful tool for assessing whether the explosion could have been nuclear or not.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Source localisation and its uncertainty quantification after the third DPRK nuclear test

Meutter

Camps

Delcloo

et al. 2018

Sci Rep

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“…The technology for measurements of Xe‐135, Xe‐133m, Xe‐133, and Xe‐131m, complying with the CTBT requirements, has been tested and evaluated for operational purposes, under the International Noble Gas Experiment (Auer et al, ). Three types of automatic measurement systems—developed independently by France, Russia, and Sweden—are currently in use in the IMS network: (i) the SPALAX (Système de Prélèvement Atmosphérique en Ligne avec l'Analyse des radioXénons) (Fontaine et al, ; Topin et al, ), (ii) the SAUNA (Swedish Automatic Unit for Noble Gas Acquisition) (Ringbom et al, ), and (iii) the ARIX (Analyzer of Radioactive Isotopes of Xenon) (Dubasov et al, ). The underlying physical principles are similar for the three systems, while differing in their technical approaches.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seasonal Variability of Xe‐133 Global Atmospheric Background: Characterization and Implications for the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear‐Test‐Ban Treaty

et al. 2018

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Global simulations of the atmospheric dispersion of worldwide industrial Xe‐133 releases have revealed a large spatial and day‐to‐day variability of the resulting so‐called Xe‐133 atmospheric background. Most stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive nuclear‐Test‐Ban Treaty Organization actually detect Xe‐133 regularly. Measured levels are explained by a varying combination of local and distant industrial sources and can interfere with discrimination of nuclear test signatures. Therefore, a better understanding of the Xe‐133 atmospheric background is needed. In this study, a validated 2 year simulation data set and a 4 year measurement data set of Xe‐133 activity concentrations have been analyzed in order to characterize possible seasonal variations of the Xe‐133 atmospheric background due to atmospheric circulation, with a focus on (i) global distributions, (ii) occurrences of detections by the IMS network, and (iii) time series of monthly averages at IMS stations. Results show a larger spatial extent of the atmospheric background during winter months, which translates into a larger number of detections on the IMS network during winter months for both hemispheres. Some IMS stations present a significant seasonal variability in terms of levels, or both in terms of levels and origins. However, not all IMS stations are subject to seasonal variations, given their location with respect to sources and large‐scale atmospheric circulation. In addition, a first set of predicted information about expected levels of atmospheric background at IMS stations not yet operational is provided, given the current knowledge of sources.

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“…The 133 Xe detections by the IMS stations used in the inverse modelling are listed in Supplementary Table S1 . At station RN45, radioxenon activity concentration is measured during a 24-h period using the Spalax system 20 , 21 . Stations RN38 and RN77 are equipped with the Sauna system 22 and measure radioxenon activity concentration twice a day during a 12~h period.…”

Section: Possible Source Regionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessment of the announced North Korean nuclear test using long-range atmospheric transport and dispersion modelling

Meutter

Camps

Delcloo

et al. 2017

Sci Rep

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On 6 January 2016, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced to have conducted its fourth nuclear test. Analysis of the corresponding seismic waves from the Punggye-ri nuclear test site showed indeed that an underground man-made explosion took place, although the nuclear origin of the explosion needs confirmation. Seven weeks after the announced nuclear test, radioactive xenon was observed in Japan by a noble gas measurement station of the International Monitoring System. In this paper, atmospheric transport modelling is used to show that the measured radioactive xenon is compatible with a delayed release from the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. An uncertainty quantification on the modelling results is given by using the ensemble method. The latter is important for policy makers and helps advance data fusion, where different nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty monitoring techniques are combined.

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SPALAX new generation: New process design for a more efficient xenon production system for the CTBT noble gas network

Cited by 26 publications

References 15 publications

Source localisation and its uncertainty quantification after the third DPRK nuclear test

Source localisation and its uncertainty quantification after the third DPRK nuclear test

Seasonal Variability of Xe‐133 Global Atmospheric Background: Characterization and Implications for the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear‐Test‐Ban Treaty

Assessment of the announced North Korean nuclear test using long-range atmospheric transport and dispersion modelling

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