Spain Tries Democracy Again

Roskin, Michael

doi:10.2307/2150107

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…5 Special attention is given to military corporate interests and the pacifying role of satisfaction-increasing placation strategies such as increased military spending, arms acquisitions, and civilian–military power sharing (Bove & Brauner, 2014; Leon, 2014; McMahon & Slantchev, 2015). Many of these co-opting strategies are at odds with the principles of democratic rule, but civil–military “pacting” was essential to the survival of transitional democracies in Latin America, Southern Europe, and elsewhere (Éncarnacion, 2001; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Rasler, 1996; Roskin, 1978-1979).…”

Section: Literature Review: Democratic Rule and The Causes Of Coup D’étatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coup d’État and Democracy

Bell

2016

Comparative Political Studies

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This article explains coup activity in democracies by adapting insights from the literature on commitment problems and framing coup around the threats leaders and potential coup plotters pose to each other. I claim democratic constraints on executive power inhibit a leader’s ability to repress threats from political rivals. Though this decreases motivations for coup attempts, it also makes democracies more vulnerable should a coup attempt occur. Consequently, democratic constraints on executive power do not reduce the frequency of coup attempts, but coups attempted against democracies are much more likely to succeed. Using several data sets of coup activity and democratic constraints, I find significant differences in coup activity in democracies and non-democracies. Relative to civilian non-democracies, democracies are about half as likely to use coup-related repression, but they face a similar frequency of coup attempts. Plots against democracies are nearly twice as likely to succeed.

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Section: Literature Review: Democratic Rule and The Causes Of Coup D’étatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coup d’État and Democracy

Bell

2016

Comparative Political Studies

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“…Bu durum aslında bir analojiye dayanmıştır. Biyolojideki insan vücut sistemi ya da fizikteki güneş sistemi gibi sosyal ve politik alanlar sistem olarak betimlenmiştir (Roskin, 1999). Uluslararası mekanda meydana gelen olgu ve olayları ampirik olarak sistem yaklaşımı (systems approach) üzerinden anlamak, açıklanmak, tahmin etmek ve hatta sisteme müdahale etmek istemişlerdir.…”

Section: şEkil 2 Sistem (Soldaki) Ve Bütün (Sağdaki)unclassified

“…Uluslararası sistemin aktörleri nasıl etkilediği ve aktörlerin birbiriyle sistem içinde nasıl etkileştiğini açıklamak için sistem yaklaşımı; bu açıklamayı gerçekleştirmek için sistem metodu ya da analizi uygulanmıştır (Roskin, 1999). Bu uygulama, Goodman'ın açıklama ve metot tanımına ve Eralp'in etkileşim tanımına bizi götürebilir.…”

Section: şEkil 2 Sistem (Soldaki) Ve Bütün (Sağdaki)unclassified

“…Bunlar güçler dengesi sistemi, gevşek çift kutuplu sistem, sıkı çift kutuplu sistem, evrensel sistem, hiyerarşik sistem, birimveto sistemidir. Bu ayrımlar üzerinden uluslararası sistemin analiz edilebileceğini ortaya koymuştur (Kaplan, 1976;Roskin, 1999;Gosh, 2020;43). Weltman'a (1972) (Weltman, 1972:303).…”

Section: şEkil 2 Sistem (Soldaki) Ve Bütün (Sağdaki)unclassified

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The Concept of System and The Definitions in the Discipline of International Relations

Gökçe

2021

Avrasya Terim Dergisi

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Bu çalışma sistem ve uluslararası sistem kavramlarını konu edinmektedir. Türkçe Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) literatürü içinde sistemin ne anlama geldiğine dair yeterli kavram çalışması yoktur. Bu nedenle hem sistem hem de uluslararası sistemin ne ifade ettiğini tespit etmek için bu çalışma ortaya konulmuştur. Ele alınan ilgili kavramları tanımlamak için nitel araştırma yöntemleri içinde yer alan kavram analizi desenine başvurulmuştur. Veriler sözlüklerden ve sistem kavramını çalışan akademisyenlerin çalışmalarından elde edilmiştir. Uİ disiplini içinde hem sistem hem de uluslararası sistem kavramının tek veya ortak bir tanımının olmadığı çalışmanın en temel vargısıdır.

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“…When Spain transitioned to democracy following the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos I, the primary instigator of Spanish democratization, relied upon his relationships with military elites to keep the military from overthrowing the state’s new political institutions. Spanish historians note that he went to great lengths to maintain amicable relationships with the generals (Roskin 1978–1979). Most notably, he used his personal connections with the military to facilitate economic pacts between Spain’s new democratic leaders and military elites (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Éncarnacion 2001).…”

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confidence: 99%

Buying Support and Buying Time: The Effect of Regime Consolidation on Public Goods Provision1

Bell¹

2011

International Studies Quarterly

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History provides many examples of benevolent dictators who become increasingly repressive and new democracies that take years to improve public welfare. I account for this temporal variation in public goods provision by considering how regime consolidation changes leaders’ incentives to provide public goods. To stay in office, all leaders must maintain a sufficient level of support from those possessing the power to replace the leader via institutional processes. Leaders of unconsolidated regimes face additional threats posed by viable extra‐institutional challengers, such as coup plotters and revolutionaries. Tests on public goods spanning political freedoms, government expenditures, education, and health generally suggest leaders’ incentives for public goods provision change as regime consolidation insulates leaders from these extra‐institutional threats to power. Regimes with inclusive institutions spend more on public goods as they consolidate and become less vulnerable to elite demands. Exclusive regimes spend more on public goods when they are vulnerable to the excluded masses, but become increasingly repressive as they become insulated from popular uprisings. Consequently, consolidation magnifies the positive effect of democracy on public goods provision. These findings have important implications for the literatures on public goods provision and regime survival.

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Spain Tries Democracy Again

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Coup d’État and Democracy

Coup d’État and Democracy

The Concept of System and The Definitions in the Discipline of International Relations

Buying Support and Buying Time: The Effect of Regime Consolidation on Public Goods Provision1

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