Space weather impact on power grids

Piccinelli, Roberta; Elisabeth, Krausmann

doi:10.1201/b19094-565

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Or were geoelectric field amplitudes just a function of the magnetic latitude of auroral‐zone ionospheric currents? Answering these questions should improve our understanding of storm‐time geoelectric hazards and usefully inform projects for improving power‐system resilience (e.g., Oughton et al., 2019; Piccinelli and Krausmann, 2014; Pirjola et al., 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping a Magnetic Superstorm: March 1989 Geoelectric Hazards and Impacts on United States Power Systems

et al. 2022

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A study is made of the relations between geomagnetic and geoelectric field variation, Earth‐surface impedance, and operational interference (“anomalies”) experienced on electric‐power systems across the contiguous United States during the 13–14 March, 1989, magnetic storm. For this, a 1‐min‐resolution sequence of geomagnetic field maps is constructed from magnetometer time series acquired at ground‐based observatories. Induced geoelectric field maps are calculated by convolving the geomagnetic maps with magnetotelluric impedance tensors. During the storm, anomalies were concentrated where the lithosphere is electrically resistive, and when and where geoelectric field amplitudes were high. This was particularly true in the Mid‐Atlantic, Northeast, and the upper Midwest. Few anomalies were experienced in other parts of the Midwest and across much of the West, where the lithosphere is more conductive, and when and where geoelectric field amplitudes were low. Peak 1‐min‐resolution geoelectric field amplitude ranged from 21.66 V/km in Maine and 19.02 V/km in Virginia to <0.02 V/km in Idaho. Latitude‐dependent organization of geoelectric hazards by auroral‐zone electrojet currents is detectable, but it is much weaker than geographic organization due to surface impedance. Hazardous geoelectric fields were induced during different storm phases, at different local times, and, by inference, by a variety of ionospheric currents. Compared to geoelectric field amplitudes realized across the United States during March 1989, hazard maps used by utility companies to estimate systems exposure have much less geographic detail and a much smaller maximum‐to‐minimum range in geoelectric field amplitude. Future research would benefit from denser geomagnetic monitoring, additional magnetotelluric surveying, and access to power‐system impact data.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping a Magnetic Superstorm: March 1989 Geoelectric Hazards and Impacts on United States Power Systems

et al. 2022

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“…Geoelectric fields in the solid Earth are induced by external geomagnetic field variations, often associated with geomagnetic storms, passing through a complex Earth filter that is determined by the conductivity structure of Earth's interior. These induced geoelectric fields give rise to anomalous quasi-static voltages across transmission lines that lead to so-called geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) within power transmission networks, which can cause operational interference and damage to critical infrastructure (e.g., Molinski, 2002;Piccinelli & Krausmann, 2014). One of the strongest geomagnetic storms to impact modern power transmission networks occurred in March 1989 when GICs caused the collapse of the Hydro-Québec power grid in Canada (e.g., Bolduc, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A 100‐year Geoelectric Hazard Analysis for the U.S. High‐Voltage Power Grid

et al. 2020

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A once‐per‐century geoelectric hazard map is created for the U.S. high‐voltage power grid. A statistical extrapolation from 31 years of magnetic field measurements is made by identifying 84 geomagnetic storms with the Kp and Dst indices. Data from 24 geomagnetic observatories, 1,079 magnetotelluric survey sites, and 17,258 transmission lines are utilized to perform a geoelectric hazard analysis with the most comprehensive data publicly available. With these data, we estimate once‐per‐century geoelectric fields at the magnetotelluric survey sites and calculate the theoretical voltages within transmission lines in the U.S. power grid. Once‐per‐century geoelectric field strengths span more than 3 orders of magnitude from a minimum of 0.02 V/km at a site in Idaho to a maximum of 27.2 V/km at a site in Maine, with nearly 30% of the surveyed land area exceeding 1 V/km. We show the influence that geoelectric field polarization has on geoelectric hazards when viewed on a power transmission network. The calculated transmission line voltages can approach 1,000 V in some transmission lines. Four regions in the United States with particularly notable geoelectric hazards are identified and discussed: the East Coast, Pacific Northwest, Upper Midwest, and the Denver metropolitan area.

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“…Our focus, here, is on the interpretation of ground-level geoelectromagnetic variation brought by the March 1940 storm and the deleterious impact it had on long-line communication-and power-system interference experienced across North America, and, especially, the contiguous United States (CONUS). Results inform modern estimates of storm-induced geoelectric hazards (e.g., Lucas et al, 2020), the vulnerability of power systems to these hazards (e.g., Pennington et al, 2021;Piccinelli & Krausmann, 2014), and risk (e.g., Baker et al, 2014;Eastwood et al, 2017;Oughton et al, 2019).…”

mentioning

confidence: 67%

“…Today, virtually all American farms are served with electricity, transmission lines are sometimes very long, and CONUS has, essentially, three giant electric‐power interconnections (e.g., Cohn, 2017). Since longer lines mean greater integrated storm‐time geopotentials between grounding points, these developments may have contributed to an increase in the vulnerability of CONUS electric‐power systems to magnetic storms (e.g., Barnes et al., 1991; Kappenman, 2004; Liu et al., 2010; Piccinelli & Krausmann, 2014; Slothower & Albertson, 1967). In this light, then, we understand why modern interest in storm‐induced geoelectric fields is focused on impacts on electric‐power systems rather than on communication systems.…”

Section: Power and Communication Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The March 1940 Superstorm: Geoelectromagnetic Hazards and Impacts on American Communication and Power Systems

et al. 2023

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An analysis is made of geophysical records of the 24 March 1940, magnetic storm and related reports of interference on long‐line communication and power systems across the contiguous United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada. Most long‐line system interference occurred during local daytime, after the second of two storm sudden commencements and during the early part of the storm's main phase. The high degree of system interference experienced during this storm is inferred to have been due to unusually large‐amplitude and unusually rapid geomagnetic field variation, possibly driven by interacting interplanetary coronal‐mass ejections. Geomagnetic field variation, in turn, induced geoelectric fields in the electrically conducting solid Earth, establishing large potential differences (voltages) between grounding points at communication depots and transformer substations connected by long transmission lines. It is shown that March 1940 storm‐time communication‐ and power‐system interference was primarily experienced over regions of high electromagnetic surface impedance, mainly in the upper Midwest and eastern United States. Potential differences measured on several grounded long lines during the storm exceeded 1‐min resolution voltages that would have been induced by the March 1989 storm. In some places, voltages exceeded American electric‐power‐industry benchmarks. It is concluded that the March 1940 magnetic storm was unusually effective at inducing geoelectric fields. Although modern communication systems are now much less dependent on long electrically conducting transmission lines, modern electric‐power‐transmission systems are more dependent on such lines, and they, thus, might experience interference with the future occurrence of a storm as effective as that of March 1940.

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Space weather impact on power grids

Cited by 8 publications

References 2 publications

Mapping a Magnetic Superstorm: March 1989 Geoelectric Hazards and Impacts on United States Power Systems

Mapping a Magnetic Superstorm: March 1989 Geoelectric Hazards and Impacts on United States Power Systems

A 100‐year Geoelectric Hazard Analysis for the U.S. High‐Voltage Power Grid

The March 1940 Superstorm: Geoelectromagnetic Hazards and Impacts on American Communication and Power Systems

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