While there is a general consensus that young innovative companies (YICs) need special attention by public policy which should aim at alleviating the financial constraints these firms commonly suffer, much less agreement has been reached on the most effective policy instruments reputed to accomplish the task. In this respect, if the scientific debate has very much revolved around the dilemma about the crowding-in or crowding-out effect of public R&D subsidies to firms, there is a dearth of scientific studies which analyse the effectiveness and potential interrelations of different policy instruments which at the same time and in the same institutional context are offered to YICs. By taking advantage of the Italian Startup Act issued in 2012, we analyse, for the first time, the possible existence of interrelationships between firm access to a Government-guaranteed (GG) bank loan program and fiscal incentives for venture capital (VC) equity investments. Results suggest two important facts. First, the two mechanisms appear to be functional to different typologies of YICs. Second, VC investments significantly reduce the probability to access GG bank loans. Overall, our analysis highlights a sort of "institutional division of labour" between the two measures and depicts what we label as a Task segmentation effect.