Soviet Tanks, American Sedans: Traces of India’s Cold War-era Hedging Towards the United States, 1966–1971

Abstract

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.

‘In Aid of Bangladesh’: The Soft Power Push by Bombay’s Civil Society Towards the Liberation of East Pakistan

“…India’s hard power support for the rebelling Bengalis, deemed traitors by the US-aligned Pakistan, pushed New Delhi’s ties with Washington—its largest food-aid supplier until then—to their nadir and the Nixon administration’s distrust for Indira Gandhi to a phase of personal enmity (Tiwary & Roy, 2021, pp. 28–29).…”