South–South Transnational Advocacy: Mobilizing Against Brazilian Dams in the Peruvian Amazon

Abstract

South-South transnational advocacy networks (SSTANs) targeting emerging states, Southern companies, and their supporting institutions warrant nuanced distinctions from traditional transnational advocacy networks that are heavily reliant on Northern actors and targets, particularly in terms of the strategies and arguments they employ. This article analyzes the dynamics of SSTANs through the case of an environmental campaign against Brazilian hydropower projects proposed in the Peruvian Amazon. It demonstrates how Southern actors are mobilizing against new and emerging patterns of South-South cooperation, which, despite occurring on unfamiliar institutional terrain, reproduces familiar asymmetrical power relations and socioenvironmental burdens.

The Politics of Transnational Advocacy Against Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian Extractive Projects in the Global South

“…The scholarship on TANs reveals unique challenges to the formation and maintenance of BRICS/South-South TANs. The tendency for South investments to flow through national development banks (NDBs), rather than multilateral development banks, limits the access points for these advocacy networks (Moreira et al, 2019). In the case of the Brazilian National Development Bank, for instance, Sierra and Hochstetler (2017) find that indirect strategies to raise public awareness and put an issue (e.g., transparency and environmental standards) on the judicial or legislative agenda have been more effective than directly targeting the bank.…”

“…Adapting to these challenges, BRICS-South TANs have found some success. The Amazonian Hydroelectric Collective anti-dam campaign, for example, successfully influenced the Peruvian state and Brazilian corporations to cancel a series of hydroelectric projects planned in Peru (Moreira et al, 2019). Financed by the Brazilian Development Bank, the projects were established through a bilateral treaty between Peru and Brazil that largely excluded civil society participation.…”

“…Drawing on scholarship, reports, and other documentation, this article adds another layer of understanding to the literature analyzing BRICS–South TANs (e.g., Cezne, 2019; Hochstetler, 2002; Moreira et al, 2019; and Rodrigues, 2004). This includes insights into the political conditions and civil society characteristics that facilitate or impede the participation of both BRICS and South-based civil society organizations in these TANs.…”

Paradoxical gaps in resilient environmental governance

“…In the case of disasters, corporations and governments face the difficulty of inadequate life cycle cost assessments of dams and the difficulty to accurately prevent the collapse of dams, despite mechanisms for cost efficient means of long-term infrastructure development (Grabowski et al 2018). This problem might be based on not understanding these complex systems (Underdal 2010) and the contested situation between the rights of indigenous people on the land and the commercial interest of hydro power dam companies (Moreira et al 2019). In January 2019, Brazil witnessed one of its most catastrophic mining accidents in history when a dam in Brumadinho, in the southeast of Brazil, collapsed killing at least 157 people (Zimmermann 2019).…”

“…For example, a number of scholars debating the impact of conservation plans for protected areas have shown how local people become victims of policies that were initially meant to enhance their knowledge and rights to land use (Goldman 2011;Massé 2019;West et al 2006). Similarly, studies have observed undesirable impacts of environmental plans on local people where controversial hydropower projects involuntarily displace minority groups (Moreira et al 2019;Tilt and Gerkey 2016) while distorting water access for irrigation (Hennig and Harlan 2018).…”