Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†

Kramer, Gary L.

doi:10.1080/0022250x.1972.9989812

Cited by 152 publications

(68 citation statements)

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“…Relatively close to our perspective is the literature on multidimensional voting models (Kramer 1972, Shepsle 1979, Denzau and Mackay 1981. Enelow and Hinich (1983) instead consider a multi-issue case in which each issue is voted sequentially in time and where the agenda induces path-dependency, that might be mitigated by the agents' forecast abilities.…”

Section: Relation To Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The construction of choice: a computational voting model

Marengo

Pasquali

2011

J Econ Interact Coord

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Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exogenously given and non decomposable alternatives. Often, on the contrary, choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles made of many interdependent components. In this paper we present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained, depending upon initial conditions and agenda, intransitive cycles and median voter dominance may be made appear or disappear, and that, finally, decidability may be ensured by increasing manipulability or viceversa.

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Section: Relation To Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The construction of choice: a computational voting model

Marengo

Pasquali

2011

J Econ Interact Coord

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“…which implies (27) for n c, and for n > N c by symmetry. For n 2 fc + 1; N cg, from lemma 4, for almost all ,…”

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confidence: 96%

Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule

Loeper

2013

QJPS

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe consider a federation in which citizens determine by federal majority rule a discretionary policy space which partially restricts the sovereignty of member states.Citizens …rst vote on the size of the discretionary space (the degree of local discretion), and then on its location on the policy space (the federal directive). Finally, each state votes on its respective policy within the discretionary space. This federal mechanism allows voters to express directly their trade-o¤ between ‡exibility and policy harmonization.We show that at the voting equilibrium, the federal directive is negatively sensitive to the preferences of nonmedian voters. Moreover, the degree of local discretion is too limited and insu¢ ciently sensitive to the magnitude of externalities. Hence, the model shows that inadequate and excessively rigid federal interventions can emerge from a neutral and democratic decision process without agency costs or informational imperfections.JEL Classi…cation Numbers: H77, D72

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“…We examine structure-induced equilibria (SIE) as developed by Kramer (1972) andShepsle (1979). Agents are assumed to vote simultaneously but separately on the issues at stake.…”

Section: Political Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of mitigation and adaptation

Habla

Roeder

2017

European Economic Review

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In this paper, we acknowledge that the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change have differential fiscal impacts. Whereas mitigation typically raises fiscal revenues, adaptation is costly to the taxpayer and to a greater extent the more distortionary the tax system is. In an OLG model with majority voting, we analyze how the choices of mitigation and adaptation are distorted under a lump-sum and a distortionary income tax regime. We find that whenever emissions and adaptation exhibit stock characteristics, the levels of mitigation and adaptation are chosen inefficiently low in the political equilibrium under lump-sum taxation. By contrast, the political equilibrium may entail inefficiently high mitigation or inefficiently high adaptation (but not both simultaneously) if the tax system is distortionary.A calibration of our model to the German economy shows that both mitigation and adaptation can be expected to be inefficiently low in the political equilibrium. Furthermore, the standard assumption of a lump-sum tax system when analyzing mitigation and adaptation is found to underestimate the loss in utilitarian welfare relative to a distortionary tax system, although mitigation levels are generally higher under the latter regime. JEL-Classification: D72, D78, H21, H23, Q58Keywords: Adaptation, Mitigation, Political Economy, Majority Voting, OLG, Environmental Taxes * We thank Kelly de Bruin, Jurate Jaraite-Kazukauski, Thomas Sterner and seminar participants at the University of Umeå for valuable comments and suggestions. Wolfgang Habla acknowledges the generous financial support from the FORMAS research program COMMONS.

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Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†

Cited by 152 publications

References 5 publications

The construction of choice: a computational voting model

The construction of choice: a computational voting model

Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule

The political economy of mitigation and adaptation

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