Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
Xuesong Huang
Abstract:I study whether self‐fulfilling bank runs can occur when banks use sophisticated contracts and withdrawal decisions are public information. In a finite‐agent version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with correlated types, I first present an example in which a bank run perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists. However, its existence relies on off‐path beliefs that are unreasonable in terms of forward induction. To discipline beliefs, I use forward induction equilibrium (Cho (1987)) as the solution concept. I show that, … Show more
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