Some remarks on Quiggin's anticipated utility

Comparative statics for rank-dependent expected utility theory

“…These generalized theories have been shown to be capable of accounting for most of the well-known violations of EU theory including the Allais paradox (Quiggin 1985, Segal 1987, the common ratio effect and the preference reversal effect .…”

Testing between alternative models of choice under uncertainty?Comment

“…As Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) and Yaari (1987) have observed, a concave weighting function (along with a concave or linear utility function) is equivalent to global risk aversion, in the sense that second stochastically dominated prospects will never be preferred. Segal (1987) has shown that this condition is also necessary if the 2 model is to be consistent with Machina's generalized Allais paradox.…”

A revealed reference point for prospect theory

“…Those reference points are feasible alternatives in a choice set, but they are always dominated by some other alternatives and, hence, are never revealed preferred. By contrast, the endogenous reference points in Shalev (2000Shalev ( , 2002, Kőszegi andRabin (2006, 2007), and Kőszegi (2010), correspond to a person's rational expectations held in the recent past, which in turn are determined in the so-called personal equilibrium. Since there may be multiple equilibria, the decision maker is required to choose the most preferred one, e.g., a preferred personal equilibrium in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) and Kőszegi (2010).…”

“…A nonlinear treatment of probabilities has also been incorporated into the rankdependent utility (RDU) model (Quiggin 1981(Quiggin , 1982Segal 1987;Wakker 1994). RDU can be seen as a special case of PT where the presence of a reference point is immaterial for attitudes toward probabilities.…”